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1   Introduction  
 
This is the second part of an comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR thereafter) understood as an extended model of corporate governance and 
objective function, based on the extension of fiduciary duties owed to the sole owner of the 
firm to all the company stakeholder (for this definition see part I,  Sacconi, 2010a)  infra). As 
in  the  first  part,  CSR  is  also  understood  as  a  self  sustaining  institution  ±  i.e.  as  a  self 
sustaining  system  of  descriptive  and  normative  beliefs  consistent  with  the  equilibrium 
behaviors performed repeatedly by agents in the domain of action of corporate governance 
(firms  and  their  stakeholders).  But  equilibria  are  multiple  in  the  game  representing  the 
strategic interaction among the firm and its stakeholders - modeled as a repeated trust game or 
VRPHVLPLODUµVRFLDOGLOHPPDJDPH¶Ostrom, 1990). Thus asserting that CSR satisfies the 
Nash  equilibrium  condition  as  an  institution  is  not  enough.  There  is  also  an  equilibrium 
selection problem. This the place where the Rawlsian social contract (Ralws, 1971, 1993) 
enters again the picture by performing its main role as normative equilibrium selection device 
from the ex ante perspective: that is, the ex ante impartial selection of a unique equilibrium 
amongst the many possible in the repeated trust game involving the firms and its stakeholders. 
Note that this was its second role previously suggested (see sec. 5 part  I, and left to this part 
where  it  is  treated  at  length),  as  distinguished  from  the  role  of  shaping  WKH SOD\HUV¶
expectations so that in the ex pot perspective they are able to predict the agreed solution as the 
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result of a cognitive process of beliefs convergence to the equilibrium, which is focused on in 
part III, (see Sacconi, 2010c and Sacconi 2008). 
To this end (in section 2) I shall discuss at length the rehabilitation of the Rawlsian maximin 
SULQFLSOHSURYLGHGE\.HQ%LQPRUH¶VJDPHWKHRUHWLFDOUHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKHVRFLDOFRQWUDFW.  
(Binmore, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2005). Contrary to the beliHIWKDW5DZOV¶ view was 
utopian, it is shown that the maximin principle provides the best account of the social contract 
XQGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWLQDµVWDWHRIQDWXUH¶DQ\DJUHHPHQWRQSULQFLSOHVIRULQVWLWXWLRQV
must be self-sustainable. In other words, to be self-sustainable and incentive-compatible, the 
agreement must be egalitarian, or in the best interest of the worst-off  player.  
Such  an  unconventional  result  has  overarching  implications  also  for  the  constitutional 
coQWUDFWRQWKHILUP¶VJRYHUQDQFHDQGFRQWUROVWUXFWXUHV7KLVLVDWKHRU\WRPDNHVHQVHRIWKH
idea  of  extended  fiduciary  duties  put  forward  in  previous  works  (Sacconi,  1997,  2000, 
2006a,b, 2007). Its main pRLQWZDVWKDWWKHVWDNHKROGHUV¶ constitutional agreement (seen as the 
rational  solution  of  an  original  bargaining  game)  will  complement  the  efficient  control 
structure  with  further  social  responsibilities  toward  non-controlling  stakeholders,  enabling 
them to participate in the surplus created by joint production through a redress rule against the 
abuse of authority (sec. 3). However, when a constitutional bargaining situation is considered 
such that the only feasible constitutions  are allocations  of exclusive property  and control 
rights, a strong imbalance of bargaining power is inevitable, so that asymmetry in the final 
surplus  distribution  will  reflect  the  asymmetry  of  decision  rights.  Then,  an  outcome 
corresponding to the arrangement of rights (ownership and control rights plus redress rights 
with the attached fiduciary duties) that immunizes non-controlling stakeholders against abuse 
of authority, and  gives  them an opportunity to  participate in  the surplus  created by joint 
production, may not belong in the equilibrium space of the constitutional choice game (sec. 
4).  This  means  that  the  outcome  of  such  a  redress  mechanism  cannot  be  obtained  in 
equilibrium (violating the self-sustainability condition) .   
The idea is that each constitution corresponds to a set of feasible (equilibrium) outcomes, and 
each of them comprises a post-constitutional bargaining solution within its feasible set of 
outcomes. Different constitutions - as they allocate rights of control to one player or another - 
will  have  post-constitutional  bargaining  solutions  differently  favorable  to  one  or  another 
player,  but  not  equally  favorable  to  all.  Agreement  at  the  constitutional  stage  selects  the 
allocation of exclusive rights of ownership and control endowed with the most efficient post-
constitutional solution in terms of incentives for the accomplishment of specific investments 3 
 
and in terms of wealth maximization. Players who forgo control in order to make agreement 
on the most efficient control structure possible, then need to be redressed through fiduciary 
duties. Implementation of such duties is an outcome coinciding with an equitable compromise 
(a  linear  combination)  of  the  post-constitutional  rational  solutions  preferred  by  different 
stakeholders as they relate to different allocations of rights, some in favor of one stakeholder, 
some in favor of another. But when the assumption is made that the only feasible outcomes 
(corresponding  to  equilibria)  are  those  belonging  to  the  outcome  set  of  constitutions 
asymmetrically allocating ownership and control rights, then the quite obvious possibility 
arises that the symmetric outcome of an equitable redress mechanism does not correspond to 
any feasible outcome.  
Many scholars of corporate governance accustomed to accepting second-best solutions  would 
then be ready to give up fairness and extended fiduciary duties in order to achieve nothing 
more than the most efficient constitution of the firm. Remarkably enough, application of the 
Rawls-Binmore theory to the social contract on corporate governance structures yields quite 
the opposite suggestion (see sec. 5). In order to be consistent with the requirement of self 
sustainability, the impartial agreement must select the constitution with the best egalitarian 
solution  among  all  the  alternative  feasible  constitutions.  That  is  to  say,  a  constitutional 
arrangement  must  be  chosen  such  that,  within  its  feasible  outcome  set,  the  solution  that 
maximizes the position of the worst-off stakeholder is traceable accepted because this is the 
best egalitarian solution with respect to all the egalitarian solutions available under alternative 
constitutions. Pareto dominance, as a principle of unanimous agreement, is therefore to be  
applied only to the comparison of feasible egalitarian solutions under alternative constitutions. 
The  social  contract  will  select  the  constitution  with  the  relatively  most  Pareto-efficient 
egalitarian solution. What is most important here is that this result follows straightforwardly 
from the requirement that the social contract should select an outcome belonging to the set of  
(impartial) equilibria, i.e. a self-sustaining institution.  
Moreover,  the  Rawlsian  theory  of  corporate  governance  refutes  much  of  the  traditional 
wisdom  in  the  domain  of  corporate  governance  as  it  has  been  viewed  by  both  new 
institutional economics and law & economics (sec. 6). Quite unconventionally again, fairness 
precedes both efficiency and welfare maximization (contrary to Kaplow and Shavell), and it 
also precedes aggregate transaction costs minimization (against Hansmann 1988, 1996). Even 
libertarians  like  HayeN¶V IROORZHUV -  who  typically  believe  that  rules  of  behavior  should 
spontaneously emerge from endogenous motivations respecting free choice  ± will have to 4 
 
concede that  under the simple ethical constraint of impartiality egalitarianism is a natural 
consequence of the self sustainability of institutions in the domain of corporate governance.  
 
2   Normative selection of an equilibrium:  Binmore vindicates Rawls  
 
By  µnormative  role¶  I  mean  the  function  of  a  contractarian  fairness  principle  in  giving 
impartial reasons for singling out a unique equilibrium solution amongst the many possible. 
Note that the normative principle is  here used  to  choose an equilibrium  point within the 
equilibrium  set  of  the  game  to  be  played  afterwards  in  the  implementation  phase.  The 
perspective is still that of an ex ante impartial choice, but it now concerns equilibria, that is, 
game solutions that are self-enforceable.  
In  order  to  accomplish  this  endeavor  a  social  contract  theory  is  needed  as  an  ex  ante 




2.1  The game of life 
The social contract on constitutional principles takes place against the background of a state 
of nature FDOOHGWKH³JDPHRIOLIH´Binmore 2005). Assume that there are two players for 
simplicity; and then that it is a repeated game, for example a repeated asymmetrical SULVRQHU¶V
dilemma (PD) or something similar to it (for example a repeated Trust Game, whereby the 
second player has an advantage over the first because she may abuse her trust, whereas she 
can  only  protect  herself  by  refraining  from  any  cooperation).  Its  payoff  set  is  a  convex-
compact  space  resulting  from  attaching  the  pla\HUV¶average  discounted  payoff  to  each 
UHSHDWHGJDPHVWUDWHJ\SURILOHPL[LQJERWKSOD\HUV¶FRRSHUDWLRQDQGFKHDWLQJLQZKDWHYHU
proportion along the repetitions of the stage games. To exemplify, the payoff space represents 
outcomes of profiles whereby both players completely cooperate, they both never cooperate, 
they choose cooperating and cheating with the same frequency, as well as profiles whereby 
one party adopts cooperation more frequently (in whatever proportion) than the other and vice 
versa.  As a whole, the payoff space (in terms of average discounted payoffs) amounts to the 
set  of  all  the  convex  combination  in  whatever  proportion  of  the  stage  game  pure  payoff 
vectors. According to the folk theorem, the equilibrium set of this game again in terms of 
average  discounted  payoffs  is  represented  by  an  extensive  region  of  the  convex  compact 
payoff space (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991)
2. On the south-west side of the payoff space 
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WKURXJKRXW DOO WKH UHSHWLWLRQV´ WKHUH LV WKH ZRUVW SRVVLEOH HTXLOLEULXPSRLQW IRU ERWK WKH
SOD\HUV 7KH SD\RII VSDFH¶V UHJLRQ WR WKH QRUWK-east  of  this  point  is  made  up  of  points 
corresponding to equilibrium strategy profiles affording the players any non-negative surplus 
over the worst possible equilibrium result. In this perspective, the social contract works as a 
way to single out principles able to select just one amongst the many equilibrium profiles of 
the repeated game, affording some mutual advantage to both the players.  
To keep things simple, let us again assume that there are only two players. The repeated game 
is played by player 1 in the role of  Adam, A for short, and player 2, in the role of  Eve, E for 
short. Adam is systematically in an advantage position over Eve because of some natural or 
historical brute fact (natural power, brute force). Hence the repeated game equilibrium set is 
ZAE (from the name of the players - Adam and Eve;  see fig.1), which is an asymmetric space. 
This means that within the equilibrium set ZAE of the repeated game there are equilibrium 
pairs advantaging A over E or E over A in the relative sense; but  the in absolute sense the 
equilibrium pairs preferred by player A give him a much higher payoffs than those given to 
player E by the equilibrium pairs she prefers. The best chances of profiting from  the game are 
quite different for the two players. In other words, there are many outcomes in which Adam 
gets a much higher payoff than Eve, whereas symmetrical outcomes, giving Eve a similar 




The game of life is repeated in the long run. As it is repeated, some details may occasionally 
change as new generations of players join. Thus, there is a chance that a player 1 is sometimes 
called upon to play in the position of Eve, while a player 2 is called upon to play in the 
position  of  Adam.  Evolutionary  games  typically  select  players  at  random  from  given 
populations (viz. players from population 1 and players from population 2)  to play any role in 
each repetition of a given. The situation is such that throughout the evolutionary history of 
humankind or societies, players that usually play as weak stakeholders may also sometimes 
(even though with small probability) occupy the role of the owner of a firm  and vice versa. 
&RQVLGHUWKDWSOD\HU¶VSURJHQ\FRQVLVWVRIPDQ\PRUHSOD\HUVWDNLQJWKHUROHRI$GDPZLWK
respect to Eve but,  due to a mutation at some point in time, Mother Nature has selected for a 
ZKLOHRQO\SOD\HU¶s sons to play the role of Eve. By chance,  these Eves may play  against 
SOD\HU¶VKHLUVZKRDUH$GDPV+HQFHSOD\HUDQGSOD\HUKDYHXQGHUJRQHDSHUPXWDWLRQ
of their roles across these game and they may retain memories of this position exchange 
through their evolutionary history. This is the evolutionary basis for the capacity to assume 
WKHRWKHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDQGGHYHORSHPSDWKHWLFSUHIHUHQFHV3XWLQQHXURVFLHQFHODQJXDJH
SOD\HU$¶V³PLUURUQHXURQV´ILUHZKHQ$VHHVSRRU(JHWWLQJVXFKDPRGHVWSD\RII[WKat it as 
if it was player A himself who had received that same payoff x. 
 
2.2   The game of morals 
All this is simply preparatory (i.e. gives an evolutionary basis) for introduction of the social 
contract  as  an  ex  ante  generally  acceptable  and  stable  equilibrium  selection  mechanism. 
)ROORZLQJWKH5DZOVLDQLGHDRIDK\SRWKHWLFDO³RULJLQDOSRVLWLRQ´%LQPRUHFDOOVWKHUHOHYDQW
choice  VLWXDWLRQ ³WKH JDPH RI PRUDOV´  which  re-elaborates  the  game  of    life  from  an 
impersonal, empathetic and impartial perspective (Binmore, 2005). It is a hypothetical choice 
situation whereby each player consider the entire set of possible equilibrium outcomes of the 
repeated game as if he/she were able to occupy each role (Adam or Eve) under each outcome 
and to receive each possible role-related payoff from each outcome. Consequently, neither of 
the players identifies with his/her role, and each of them (player 1 or  2) takes it for granted 
that there is an equal chance of occupying the positions of both A or E interchangeably. These 
are the typical assumptions made when the original position is seen as a choicHXQGHUWKH³YHLO
RILJQRUDQFH´. However there are distinct hypotheses that must be introduced step by step. 
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First of all, LPSHUVRQDOLW\LVWKHFDSDFLW\WRFRQVLGHUQRWMXVWRQH¶VRZQQDUURZSHUVRQDOSRLQW
of view and to assume every possible personal perspective when assessing the outcome space 
± i.e. both players 1 and 2 view the decision problem from the personal perspectives of both 
Adam and Eve. This requirement is captured by the geometrical construction of a payoff 
VSDFHWUDQVODWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH&DUWHVLDQD[HVUHSUHVHQWLQJSOD\HUDQG¶VXWLOLWLHV
(payoffs) respectively. Given the initial payoff space ZAE , the translation generates a new  
payoff space ZEA)RUHDFK³SK\VLFDO´RXWFRPHRIWKHRULJLQDOJDPHUHSUHVHQWHGE\DSRLQWLQ
ZAE) this translation generates an outcome (a point in ZEAZLWKWKHSOD\HUV¶VDQG¶VVRFLDO
and personal positions (A and E respectively) symmetrically replaced. So that player 2 (ex-E, 
QRZLQWKHUROHRI$¶REWDLQVH[DFWO\WKHRXWFRPHWKDWZDVJRWE\SOD\HULQWKHUROHRI$
³EHIRUHWKHWUDQVODWLRQ´ZKHUHDVSOD\HUH[-A, now in the role RI(¶ gets exactly the 
outcome  that were got by player 2 when s/he was in the position of E. Hence, for every 
equilibrium point in the original outcome set ZAE, whatever the equilibrium outcome afforded 
to player 1 in the initial representation, the same outcome will be afforded to player 2 under 
the translated outcome set ZEA, and vice versa (see Binmore, 2005). 
 
2.4   Empathetic preferences and interpersonal utility comparisons  
However, a point must be raised here. Player 1 and 2 are just labels for  individual players, 
EXWDFRPSOHWHGHVFULSWLRQRIDSOD\HU¶VSUHIHUHQFHFDQRQO\EHJLYHQZKHQVKHWDNHVD
particular social role and personal position as Adam or Eve. In assuming the role/position of 
Eve, player 1 (normally Adam) tests his psychological capacity for empathetic identification 
with the preferences held by player 2, who usually plays in the role/position of Eve.  
Consider first what is not an exercise of empathy (but autism ± as Binmore suggests, see 
Binmore, 2005$OWKRXJKSOD\HUQRZLQWKHUROH$¶UHFHLves the consequences of player 1 
when he was A, she is incapable of evaluating them in terms of the same preference as player 
¶VLQWKHUROHRI$DQGWRFRPSDUHWKHVHSUHIHUHQFHVDQGWKHLUXWLOLW\PHDVXUHZLWKWKH
preferences he had in the role of E. On the contrary, she keeps the preferences and utility 
measure she had when she was in the role of E. Hence the translated ZEA need not be a 
symmetrical image of ZAE.  
However, this is not the proper manner to construct the original position, which is designed to 
enable the players to exercise their capacity for empathetic identification. What is required of 
SOD\HUZKLOHKHLV(¶LVWRXQGHUVWDQGZKDWLWPHDQVIRUSOD\HUWREHLQWKH(UROHZLWKKHU
own preferences, and vice versa. Under empathetic preference, player 1 (respectively, player 8 
 
ZKHQKHUHVSVKHWDNHVWKHSRVLWLRQ(¶UHVS$¶H[SHULHQFHVEHLQJLQWKLVSRVLWLRQZLWK
the preference that another player  had when she (he) was in position E (resp. A).  They thus 
carry out interpersonal comparisons of utility, which means that player 1, both in the role of A 
RU(¶XVHVWKHVDPHXWLOLW\XQLWWRUHSUHVHQWDQGFRPSDUHKLVempathetic preferences with his 
personal  preference  between  the  two  positions  (see  Harsanyi  1977).  The  capacity  for 
empathetic preference is a distinctive trait that makes human psychology what it is. Binmore 
assumes (and I follow him) that biological evolution has equipped us not only with a capacity 
± PD\EHRXU³PLUURUQHXURQV´- for empathetic introspection and simulation but also with the 
FRPSHWHQFHWRUHSUHVHQWGLIIHUHQWLQGLYLGXDOV¶SUHIHUHQFHVLQDIDLUO\VLPLODUPDQQHUWKDWLV
by means of fairly similar utility units (Binmore 2005). 
What we have now are two spaces XAE and XEA, one the symmetrical image of the other (see 







Space  XEA  results  from    the  symmetrical  translation  of  all  points  of  the  first  space  into 
(symmetrical) points of the second. Recall that in the game with payoff space XAE player 1 is 
A (with payoff measured on the horizontal axis), and player 2 is E (with payoff measured on 
the vertical axis). Under the translation , player 1 (ex A) becomes E¶ (with utilities identical to 
(DQGSOD\HUH[(EHFRPHV$¶ZLWKXWLOLWLHVLGHQWLFDOWR$2ZLQJWRWKHV\PPHWU\RI
the  translation,  for  each  outcome  x  in  XAE,  where  the  two  players  get  payoff  xA,  xE, 
respectively for player 1 and 2,  we may find within the space XEA a point [¶ [¶(¶[¶$¶)  
where payoffs are simply exchanged  between the players 1 and 2, i.e. such that player 1 gets  
[¶(¶= xE,  and player 2 gets  [¶$¶= xA. Hence, exactly what was got by player 1 (as A)  now 
EHORQJVWRSOD\HUDV$¶), while the payoff got before by player 2 (as E) is now obtained by 
SOD\HUDV(¶ 
 
2.5   Impartiality and solution invariance 
This construction allows each player to put himself into the shoes (A or E roles) of the other 
player  and  vice  versa.  But  now  that  the  players  are  impersonal  -  i.e.  they  properly 
(empathetically) consider the decision problem from every personal point of view, but do not 
identify themselves with whatever personal perspective - what is required is that they give an 
impartial solution to the problem; a solution that is not biased to the advantage of either 
player, and does not put any personal role in a position of differential advantage with respect 
to others. A natural consequence for the equilibrium selection problem is that the solution 
must have some invariance under the position replacement, so that the player can continue to 
recognize and choose it in both positions. Impartiality thus simply implies that the solution 
must be invariant under this pay-off space translation, because the solution has to be accepted  
by  each  player  under  both  the  roles  s/he  will  occupy,  i.e.  it  cannot  be  contingent  on  a 
particular role-position s/he occupies. This seems to mean that each player must get from the 
VROXWLRQWKHVDPH³DFFHSWDEOH´SD\RIIZKDWHYHUWKHUROH$RU(KHWDNHVLHZKDWHYHUWKH
SDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQKHWDNHVLQWKHJDPH7KXVDQimpartial solution is an equilibrium point that 
allows  each  player  to  achieve  a  payoff  which  is  invariant,  whatever  the  role  the  player 
happens to occupy. By contrast, a solution (given a particular representation of the game pay-
off space) is said to depend on the particular personal and  strategic position that players 
hold  in  the  game  if  implementing  the  corresponding  equilibrium  yields  payoffs  that  the 
players could not obtain if the same equilibrium point were implemented under the symmetric 
translation of the pay-off space ± that is, under the symmetric replacement of the players with 10 
 
respect to each outcome. Translation invariance must be satisfied in order for the equilibrium 
point selected to be normatively considered the solution.  
It is fairly clear that this property is satisfied if the initial payoff space XAE  is restricted to the 
bisector of the Cartesian plan, i.e. if the outcome space is constrained to satisfy the condition 
that any outcome is mapped onto itself by a symmetric translation of the outcome space with 
respect the Cartesian axes. But of course this is very far from being the general case (consider 
however  section  5  where  this  case  is  relevant).  In  general  a  payoff  space,  whether 
symmetrical or otherwise, will contain many outcomes that under a payoff space symmetric 
translation will be mapped onto another point in the Cartesian plan by inverting individual 
payoffs in the payoff vector. In other words, invariance would require a solution to be located 
on the bisector, which seems at a first glance to be a very restrictive condition with respect to 
payoff spaces in general. 
To be sure, symmetric and asymmetric payoffs spaces are not on an equal footing in this 
respect. A symmetrical outcome space can be simply assumed to have a symmetrical solution. 
When an outcome space is perfectly symmetrical, there is no reason to imagine that there are 
major differences between the players. Nor there is any need to impose explicit impersonality 
and impartiality between players who are completely equal in any respect: they will directly 
jump  to  the  egalitarian  solution,  which  is  typically  on  the  bisector  where  any  symmetric 
translation of the outcome space will result in outcome invariance ﾠ(this was also John Nash's 
intuition, see Nash (1950)).  
But now assume that the equilibrium space is asymmetrical, as XAE in fact is. Why not admit 
that, without an explicit requirement of impartiality and impersonality, unequal self-interested 
players would produce  by their bargaining process  whatever  result other than  a perfectly  
equal one?  Thus, assume that any player would ex ante accept (under a given representation 
of the pay-off space) any equilibrium point but an egalitarian one as the solution. Under the 
pay-off space translation XEA this equilibrium point translates into a different point outside the 
original pay-off space. Once the player positions have been exchanged, the pay-off space 
translation identifies a point corresponding to the same equilibrium, but this point (a pay-off 
vector) does not afford each player the same pay-off as before (simply because it replaces the 
pay-RIIRIWKHSUHYLRXVO\µIRUWXQDWH¶SOD\HUZLWKWKDWRIWKHSUHYLRXVO\µXQIRUWXQDWH¶RQHDQG




2.6   Veil of ignorance, and equally-probable mixtures 
The invariance condition in the case of a large space with numerous asymmetric outcomes  is 
UHJDLQHGE\LQWURGXFLQJDQRWKHUVWHSLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH³RULJLQDOSRVLWLRQ´LHE\
imposing (following Harsanyi and not Rawls on this point) the probabilistic interpretation of 
WKH³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´.  The veil of ignorance according to this version (see Binmore, 2005) 
FRQVLVWVRIFRPSOHWHSUREDELOLVWLFXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWSOD\HUDQG¶VUROHV$RU(LQWKH
game, i.e. complete uncertainty about which of the two asymmetric spaces XAE and XEA will 
actually take place. This amounts to saying that each space has probability ½ to represent the 
actual outcome space of the game. If the players were required to choose a joint strategy that 
produces the outcome x in the outcome space  XAE, they would consider that this choice will 
achieve the outcome x only with probability ½, whereas it may also achieve by probability ½ 
WKHV\PPHWULFRXWFRPH[¶ZKHUHWKHSOD\HUV¶SRVLWLRQVDUHPXWXDOO\H[FKDQJHG 
The probabilistic version of the veil of ignorance implies that when a player chooses in the 
original position s/he must always account for the expected value of any decision. For any 
selection of a particular equilibrium point, this amounts to always considering the equally-
probable mixture of the payoffs s/he gets under that particular outcome and its symmetric 
translation. We are thus back to the 45° bisector, where all the expected values of equally 
probable mixtures of symmetric outcomes belonging to spaces XAE and XEA do in fact lie.  
This is what gives invariance to the solution also in the case of an initially asymmetric payoff 
space: when a player considers as the candidate solution an equilibrium point s in XAE, s/he 
must also account for its translation s¶LQWR;EA, and in fact s/he takes as the actual candidate 
solution payoff the mid-point on the straight line representing the linear combination of the 
two outcomes s and s¶:KDWPDWWHUVIRUWKLVFKRLFHLVWKHH[SHFWHGYDOXHRIWKHHTXDOO\-
probable combination of his/her payoff for the equilibrium s in XAE and his/her payoff for its 
symmetric translation s¶LQXEA . 
 
2.7   Feasibility  
Decision making under the veil of ignorance raises the further question as to whether equally 
probable combinations of symmetric outcomes are  themselves feasible terms of agreement. 
The  question  is  whether  is  it  feasible  to  agree  on  a  jointly  randomized  pair  of  strategy 
combinations that generates two outcomes with the same probability, in such a way that one 
may consider at least ex ante the expected value as the utility that one will actually receive 
from selecting the joint strategy combinations. This makes sense only if one is confident that, 12 
 
whatever outcome may be selected by the random device attached to the pair of strategy 
combinations (or outcomes), it will be put into practice. Put differently, whatever outcome is 
selected, it will be automatically enforced. The opposite hypothesis is that when the time at 
last  arrives  that    the  agreement  must  be  implemented  by  a  random  choice  of  the  actual 
outcome,  if  the  selected  outcome  does  not  satisfy  a  player,  the  latter  can  renegotiate  it. 
7\SLFDOO\SOD\HUZKHQE\FKDQFHDQRXWFRPHLVVHOHFWHGLQZKLFKKHLV(¶PD\DVNWR
renegotiate the outcome selected in order to have a new chance of occupying the luckiest role 
of A as an outcome is selected. After all, in the game of life he de facto plays in the role of A 
(see Binmore 2005) .  
The question would be simply solved if the mid-point of the probabilistic mixture was an 
equilibrium point on its own. If in correspondence to this mid-point there is an equilibrium 
point formed of strategies (pure or mixed) that in practice the players may adopt in the ex post 
game, then that equilibrium can be selected in order to generate an impartial solution. I would 
say that this is not beyond any doubt, for player could maintain doubts about the obedience of 
other real-life  players to an action dictated by the random mechanism. However, there is no 
incentive in this case to defect from the outcome selected by the random mechanism. The case 
LVGLIIHUHQWLIWKHµPLG-SRLQW¶UHVXOWVIURPWKHFRQYH[FRPELQDWLRQMRLQWUDQGRPL]DWLRQRI
two points each alternatively belonging to one of the two basic pay-off spaces, but it actually 
falls  outside  both  the  basic  spaces  and  their  intersection.  Certainly,  such  mid-points  of 
equally-probable mixtures falling outside both the space XAE and XEA cannot be equilibria in 
WKH³JDPHRIOLIH´ 
 
2.8   The Deus ex machina hypothesis  
Here a basic methodological decision must be made. Joint randomization is an admissible 
operation within the context of cooperative games, where joint strategies (plans of action) can 
be  always  randomized  by  an  interpersonally  valid  random  mechanism  without  fear  that 
individual players will act according to separate mixed strategies in practice. But cooperative 
games assume that an exogenous mechanism will enforce whatever agreement on any jointly 
randomized outcomes: this amounts to what can be called a Dues ex machina hypothesis.  
At  the  methodological  level,  however,  the  modeller  must  decide  whether  or  not  it  is 
appropriate to assume ± or whether or not the players actually believe in ± the existence of 
God as an external enforcer for whichever agreement to which the players subscribe in the 
³RULJLQDOSRVLWLRQ´,I*RGH[LVWVWKHQWKHRXWFRPHVSDFHZLOOH[SDQGVLJQLILFDQWO\EHFDXVHLW13 
 
will also include all the linear combinations of any pair of points in XAE and XEA, i.e. the 
bargaining game in the original position will become the convex hull of all the points in the 




In this case there is an open choice among a wide variety of principles. For example, the 
utilitarian solution seems reasonable because it suggests taking as the solution the point in 
each space where the utility sum is maximised, and then considering their mean value. We 
thus  do  not  have  to  concern  ourselves  with  what  the  players  will  do  when  the  veil  of 
ignorance is removed and hence face the situation where one player is reduced to extreme 
poverty in order to maximize the utility sum.  
We are looking for contractarian principles. Assume that under each  representation of the 
payoff space players agree by rational bargaining on the relevant Nash bargaining solution. 
Hence, the equally probable combination of the two Nash bargaining solutions (NBS), each 
belonging to space XAE or XEA respectively, seems to be the obvious candidate. This means 
that player 2 will take it for granted that s/he will be afforded the payoff resulting at the mid-
point  along  the  straight  line  joining  his/her  payoffs  at  the  two  NBS,  N1  and  N2,  each 
belonging to the relevant  payoff space XAE or XEA respectively. What s/he gets in fact is 14 
 
his/her expected payoff at the point ½ N1+ ½ N2, a point that requires the presence of a Deus 
ex machina to be implemented because it does not belong either to XAE or to XEA. 
Nevertheless, believing that God will always be ready to play the role of an external enforcer 
is not the most appropriate hypothesis for a decision in the original position. The idea of a  
³VWDWHRIQDWXUH´ZRXOGEHSRLQWOHVVLQWKLVFDVH,QIDFWLWPHDQVPDLQWDLQLQJWKDWRQO\
agreements corresponding to equilibrium points of the underlying non-cooperative game of 
OLIHFDQEHH[SHFWHGWREHLPSOHPHQWHGEHFDXVHWKH\DUHVHOIVXVWDLQLQJDQGGRHVQ¶WUHTXLUH
any previous authority to impose them.  In other words, the game considered here is non-
cooperative. Thus one is not allowed to generate from the original outcome space and its 
symmetric translation the convex hull of all their components (see Binmore, 1987).  
It  follows  that  both  the  equally  probable  combinations  of  the  Utilitarian  and  the  Nash 
bargaining solutions are ruled out because they do not belong to the payoff space intersection  
XAE XEA.  
To explain, assume that a random mechanism is agreed upon, and it randomly selects the 
SD\RIIGLVWULEXWLRQFRUUHVSRQGLQJWR1ZKHUHSOD\HULVLQWKHUROHRI(¶6LQFHLQWKHDFWXDO
game of life player 1 is in fact RFFXS\LQJ$¶VUROHKHFDQWRGHFOLQHWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKH
randomly selected solution N2 because it is not enforced by itself. Thus, in the event that the 




simply refuse to comply by asserting that his actual role in the game of life is playing as A. 
Why, then, should player 2 enter the original position.  It seems cheap  talk without any 
UHOHYDQFHWRWKHSOD\HUV¶DFWXDOEHKDYLRU6XPPLQJXSWKHUHLVQR scope for agreeing under 
the veil of ignorance on outcomes that cannot be enforced.  
 
2.9   No Deus ex machina    
Contrary  to  the  conventional  wisdom,  this  does  not  require  giving  up  either  the  original 
position or the veil of  ignorance. Binmore suggests retaining symmetric payoff translations 
(impersonality), empathetic preferences and equally-probable mixtures (impartiality), but to 
skip the hypothesis that God is ready to serve as an external (dues ex machina) enforcer, thus 
adding the requirement of self-sustainability (Binmore 2005). This consists of restricting the 
selection of the acceptable solution only to within the intersection of the original outcome 15 
 
space and its symmetric translation i.e. XAE XEA. Any selection within this set, in fact, does 
not create the feasibility problem just considered because any point in the intersection set 
corresponds to an equilibrium point that is always existent as long as it belongs to both the 
original  and  the  translated  outcome  sets,  viz.  an  equilibrium  outcome  that  would  always 
materialize if either XAE or XEA were actually the case. 
Thus one way to satisfy the condition of solution invariance under the symmetric replacement 
of players with respect to the payoff space follows quite naturally. As before, the veil of 
ignorance entails considering as admissible only equally-SUREDEOHPL[WXUHVRIHDFKSOD\HU¶V
pay-offs derivable from an equilibrium point and its symmetric translation. Necessarily, the 
solution will be a point on the 45° straight line (the bisector) connecting the origin of the 
intersection space XAE XEA to its north-east frontier, where all the admitted equally-probable 
mixtures  lie  (see  fig.  4).  Each  outcome  resident  on  the  bisector  is  invariant  under  the 
symmetric translation of the outcome space. But each of VXFK³PLG-SRLQWV´DOVRQHFHVVDULO\
identifies one equilibrium that the players can ex post achieve by a feasible pure or mixed 
strategy as long as it belongs to the intersection set XAEXEA. 
Moreover, consider that the space XAEXEA is also a symmetric space on its own. It is, in 
fact, the collection of all those pairs of symmetrical points - like x and y generated one from 
the other by a symmetrical payoff space translation -  which are at the same time elements of 
both the spaces XAE and XEA. separately. Thus XAEXEA coincides with the symmetric sub-set 
of each space XEA  and XEA.. 
Given symmetry of the payoff space, bargaining theory becomes extraordinary simple. The 
bargaining solution must be taken on the 45° bisector deriving from the origin at the point 
where it intersects with the north-east boundary of the payoff space. Being on a straight line 
deriving from the status quo and pointing north-east simply means that the solution provides 
mutual gains to both the players with respect to the status quo. Being on the bisector means 
that mutual gains are equal. This depends on the symmetry of the payoff space. Given any 
agreement on which a player may insist, there is a symmetric agreement in the same outcome 
space, with the same payoffs exchanged between the players, on which the other party may 
insist as well. The reasons for insisting on each side are equally strong (under whichever 
definition) and would be perfectly balanced. It is then reasonable to expect rational bargaining 
to  lead  to  an  agreement  located  at  the  midpoint  of  the  linear  combination  joining  any 
symmetric pair of possible agreements. Lastly, that the solution is at the intersection point  16 
 
with  the  north-east  boundary  simply  implies  Pareto  optimality  -  which  means  that  equal 
mutual gains must be as high as possible. 




                          
         
All these qualifications seems very natural for the selection of a single equilibrium point 
within the intersection set XAE XEA  given its symmetry. The result is the Nash Bargaining 
Solution (NBS) for the special case of a symmetrical payoff space, which is also the same as 
the  egalitarian solution: the surplus  over the status  quo point is  distributed to  players in 
(feasible) maximal equal shares. Since, in our construction, we have assumed interpersonal 
utility comparability, this means that the players get substantially the same amount of welfare 
or the same level of needs satisfaction over the status quo.  
 
2.10   General validity of the egalitarian solution  
However, our starting point was not a symmetric payoff space. Hence the decision to restrict 
the solution to the symmetric intersection set XAE XEA  must rest on some reasons direct or 
 17 
 
indirect in favour of egalitarianism. To appreciate this, consider that egalitarianism requires 
WKDWLILWLVZDQWHGWRUHDFKDQDJUHHPHQWXQGHUWKH³RULJLQDOSRVLWLRQ´WKHDJUHHGVROXWLRQ
PXVWEHVXFKWKDWWKHSOD\HUV¶SD\RIIVDUHLQYDULDQWWRWKHV\PPHWULFDOSHUPXWDWLRQRIWKH
SOD\HUV¶ SRVLWLRQV DQG UROHV.  The  solution  is  a  point  in  the  payoff  space  such  that  the 
individual  payoff  allotted  to  each  player  must  remain  perfectly  unchanged  under  the 
V\PPHWULFWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHSD\RIIVSDFHZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHSOD\HUV¶XWLOLW\-Cartesian axes.   
This  invariance  condition  is  much  stronger  than  the  simple  requirement  that  the  solution 
concept  (and  its  corresponding  maximum  value,  i.e.  the  maximal  value  resulting  from 
aggregation from whatever social welfare function) be invariant under the mutual replacement 
of players with respect to their roles and positions. In this second case, whereas the value of 
the solution function would remain unchanged (for example, the outcome where the Nash 
bargaining product is maximal is invariant to any independent affine utility transformation of 
the payoff space and hence also to its symmetrical translation from XAE to XEA), the payoff 
allocated  to each player would vary according to the translation. Hence, in general, players 
would not preserve the same payoffs that they had before the replacement.  
By contrast, the egalitarian solution amounts to saying that the anonymity of social roles does 
QRWMXVWLI\DQ\LQHTXDOLW\RIGLVWULEXWLRQ³:KRJHWVZKDW´FDQQRWGHSHQGRQZKRJHWVWKH
social role of Adam or Eve, no matter that the assignment of social roles is anonymous, and 
ERWKSOD\HUDQGSOD\HUWKLQNLWHTXDOO\SRVVLEOHWREHLQ$RU(¶VUROHV(JDOLWDULDQLVP
seems to rest on a more basic idea of equality among people, which is antecedent to the 
differences (utility function, strategy set, etc.) associated with their A or E social roles. It 
seems to reflect a basic feature of the original position where all these difference are weighted 
out. Only perfect equality is acceptable in the original position because if all the positions  
must be mutually interchanged, nobody is able to claim a payoff that others could not also 
claim. And in case the claims each player would make from any different standpoints were 
mutually incompatible, they should be compromised by an equally probable mixture of the 
two.  
However, the egalitarian distribution does not necessarily follow directly from the equality of 
participants in the original position. The main argument in its favor is indirect. Stability, 
which is not an ethical assumption, is sufficient here. In fact, in order to make such agreement 
credible, it may be constrained to belong to the symmetric subset of the two equally possible 
spaces of claimable outcomes. Owing to the symmetry of this space the solution is necessarily 
egalitarian. But what requires a symmetric payoff space, which in turn implies egalitarianism, 18 
 
is  the  ex  post  feasibility  and  stability  of  outcomes.  Hence  stability  plus  impersonality 
(symmetric  inter-changeability)  and  impartiality  (equally  probable  mixtures)  leads  to  the 
egalitarian solution.  
 
2.11   Rawls vindicated also to not Kantians 
By this route Binmore vindicates Rawls and his proposal of the maximin principle as a choice 
rule in the original position also when it is seen in the apparently alien context of a game-
WKHRUHWLFVRFLDOFRQWUDFW%LQPRUH,QIDFW(YH¶VSD\RIIVWKRVHDOORWWHGWR
the disadvantaged player,  are maximized within both the payoff spaces XAE  and XEA. When 
players 1 and 2, through their position permutation, WDNH(YH¶VUROHunder the alternative  label 
RI(DQG(¶UHVSHFWLYHO\WKH\ERWKKDYHWKHLUSD\RIIVPD[LPL]HG 
It should be noted, however, that egalitarian and maximin  solution are based neither on a 
direct intuition in favour of such payoffs distributions nor on an extreme form of risk aversion 
(as Rawls himself seemed to think). According to Binmore, they depend on the requirement 
of the ex post stability of any agreement reached in the original position when joined with the 
genuine ethical requirements of symmetrical place permutation of players, veil of ignorance 
and the capacity for empathetic preferences (Binmore 2005).  
In essence, an agreement in the original position must be taken seriously. Each player ± the 
disadvantaged one in particular ± is thus entitled to decline an agreement that renders the 
impersonality and impartiality of the solution purely illusory due to its ex post instability. 
6ROXWLRQLQYDULDQFHXQGHUWKHH[FKDQJHRIWKHSOD\HUV¶SRVLWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHSD\RII
space,  and  equally  probable  mixtures  of  symmetric  outcomes,  are  hypotheses  that  any 
credible agreement in the original position must satisfy effectively, not fictitiously. But this 
would not be possible if the agreement fell outside the intersection set wherein all agreements 
can be implemented in equilibrium. Hence, the disadvantaged  player has veto power over 
such an illusory agreement. This point resembles the one that Rawls made by stating that in 
the original position - due to the recognized moral arbitrariness of inequality in general - the 
disadvantaged party has veto power over all the inequalities that do not maximize his/her 
benefit as well. Here, alternatively, s/he has the capacity to veto every agreement that cannot 
be trusted as fair because its implementation will necessarily turn out to be biased in favour of 




3   Constitutional contract over the control structure of the firm 
 
What does this Rawlsian social contract theory tell us about the selection of a CSR  model of 
corporate governance and a firm control structure?  In order to give an answer I need to return 
to the theory of constitutional contract on control structures of the firm, which was at the basis 
of my previous definition of the normative multi-stakeholder model of corporate governance  
(see Sacconi, 1991, 1997, 2000, 2006a,b, 2007a, 2008). It is a contractarian theory of an ex 
DQWHFKRLFHFRQFHUQLQJWKHFRQWUROVWUXFWXUHRIWKHILUPVHHQDVWKHILUP¶V³FRQVWLWXWLRQ´VHH
also Vanberg, 1992). The model rests on the analogy between social contract theories used to 
justify on one hand the legal ordering  by constitutional contract (Buchanan, 1975; Brock, 
197 DQG WKH PXWXDOO\ DGYDQWDJHRXV PRUDO UXOHV RI D VRFLHW\ µE\ DJUHHPHQW¶ *DXWKLHU
1986), and on the other hand the economic theory of the efficient control structure of the firm 
based  on  the  idea  of  contractual  incompleteness  (Williamson,  1975;  Grossman  and  Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995).  
 
3.1   A multistage decision model.  
As  far  as  the  latter  is  concerned,  this  model  is  a  multi-step  decision model  with  timing,  
involving the potential members of a productive coalition S. At time t = 1 the allocation of 
rights  is  decided,  and  this  determines  the  control  structure  exerted  over  the  productive 
coalition S. At this step, however, not only are the ownership structure and the related residual 
rights of control allocated but also any other right and responsibility owed to non-controlling 
VWDNHKROGHUVXFKWKDWWKH\JLYHWKHPDQ\OHYHORISURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWWKH³DEVROXWHSRZHU´RI 
those in the position to make residual decisions (here there is a departure from the standard 
incomplete contract model) .  
At  time  t  =  2  the  right-holding  individuals  (both  owners  and  non-owners)  take  specific 
investment  decisions  with  a  view  to  the  completion  of  subsequent  transactions.  Such 
investment decisions cannot be required in the ex ante contract because they cannot be ex ante 
described in a formal contract.  
At time t = 3 events may occur which are also unforeseen by  the initial contract. These events 
reveal the possibility of further decisions that may be essential to the value of investments 
already  undertaken.  For  example,  these  decision  are  essential  for  implementing  some 
technical innovation that the foregoing investment has made possible. Such decisions may 
SK\VLFDOO\SHUWDLQWRRQHSOD\HURUDQRWKHU+RZHYHU³H[DQWH´ULJKWVDOORFDWHFRQWURORYHU20 
 
these decisions in an indirect way. A party in the position of an authority in the firm may 
order those parties who do not formally control the firm but are in the physical condition to 
implement decisions,  to execute actions chosen by the first party.  In this way, an investment 
- when introduced at time 2 ± is exploited so as to derive surplus value from it. 
At time t = 4 a new bargaining game begins, defined for each allocation of rights, given 
whatever investment decisions were taken at time 2. Time 4 bargaining concerns decisions 
revealed as possible at step 3, according to control rights and responsibility. How time 4 
bargaining is resolved depends on the allocation of rights at time 1. Thus, according to the 
ILUP¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQH[SRVWEDUJDLQLQJZLOOEHLQIDYRXURIRQHRURWKHURIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ
the sense that these will be able to appropriate shares of the corporate surplus depending on 
how may rights (ownership, control, protection, verification, accountability etc.) they have 
acquired at step 1.  
Here the analogy with constitutional economy theory emerges: in fact, the overall collective 
decision  problem  is  modelled  as  a  compounded  two-step  bargaining  game:  an  ex  ante 
constitutional bargaining game GC RQWKH³FRQVWLWXWLRQ´DQGDQH[SRVW³SRVW-FRQVWLWXWLRQDO´
bargaining game GI RQWKHFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWFRQFHUQLQJWKHVXUSOXV¶VGLVWULEXWLRQDPRQJVW
the coalition S members. First, the constitutional bargaining game GC is carried out (at time t 
 ZKHQZKDWLVDWVWDNHLVD³FRQVWLWXWLRQ´LHDVXEVHWRIWKHORJLFDOO\SRVVLEOHVWUDWHJLHV
open to each player at time 1 is singled out. This set will constrain the bargaining strategy set 
open to each player at the post-constitutional stage. Because it is a restriction on the initial set 
of strategies, and defines a subset of strategies available to each player, it can be understood 
DVD³FRQVWLWXWLRQ´WKDWLVDGHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKH natural liberties of each player that institutes 
the correlated set of rights and responsibilities held by all the other players. The not obvious 
point here is that the first agreement concerns not just a single joint strategy profile, but a set 
of possible joint strategies. Accordingly, the GC game is a game that does not single out a 
joint strategy but an entire set (subset) of joint strategies that could constitute the possible 
actions and agreements allowed by the given constitution. Second, a subsequent bargaining 
game is played (at time t = 4) within the limits of the given constitution, and wherein the 
players make a choice among the available joint strategies allowed by the agreement reached 
at the constitutional step. 
The constitutional economics aspect of the model introduces an ex ante social contract on the 
allotment of rights at step 1 as a bargaining game; whereas bargaining was admitted by the 
incomplete contract model only at step 4 (where also the constitutional economics model 21 
 
posits  the  post-constitutional  bargaining)  so  that  the  ex  ante  decision  remained  quite 
unspecified ± a somewhat mysterious collective decision  based on the intent to minimize 
transaction coasts.  
However,  the analogy with the incomplete contract model explains why the constitutional 
contract  is  a  two-stage  decision.  The  social  contract  is  incomplete:  it  cannot  provide  for 
whatever  particular  decision  in  detail.  On  the  contrary,  it  only  provides  for  the  ex  ante 
assignation of decision rights. In the second stage, therefore, decision rights influence the 
post-constitutional division of the surplus by means of post-constitutional bargaining, after 
investments  have  been  undertaken  and  also  after  new  decision  opportunities  have  been 
revealed.  
Nevertheless,  as  in  much  of  the  incomplete  contract  literature,  here  the  simplifying 
assumption will be made that a resolution in terms of surplus division can be assigned to each 
constitution at the first stage, so to speak. Given each constitution, players can forecast the 
single  post-constitutional  solution  for  that  constitution  in  terms  of  post-constitutional 
bargaining: a fact that the player can assess by looking onward from the first stage in order to 
decide the constitution on which s/he wants to agree. Put simply, at the first step the game is 
split into numerous sub-games, each defined in terms of a given subset of the basic strategy 
space. Then a solution is computed for each sub-game. Hence the overall range of the sub-
game  solutions  is  assessed  and  the  different  ex  post  solutions  are  compared  at  the 
constitutional stage (ex ante decision) in order to give a basis for the constitutional choice in 
WHUPVRIHDFKFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶VRXWFRPH7KLVLVDVWURQJVLPSOLILFDWLRQLQGHHGEHFDXVHLWVKRXOG
be admitted that, owing to  proper contract  incompleteness,  the realisation of the possible 
available  amounts  of  surplus  (and  hence  the  payoff  value  related  to  each  concrete  joint 
strategy)  must  be  learnt  only  after  specific  investments  have  been  made,  and  after  the 
revelation of unforeseen events that allow surpluses to be made out of investments. These 
facts, because they cannot be included in the contract, would be unforeseen at the first stage, 
and hence would not allow the onward assessment of alternative constitutions in terms of their 
final payoffs distribution.  
This  would  require  modelling  the  constitutional  contract  as  a  choice  with  vague  payoff 
variables  (maybe  fuzzy  payoffs)  ±  which  is  also  consistent  with  our  solution  of  the 
constructive/cognitive problem in part I of this essay (see Sacconi 2010a, infra). ± i.e. the 
specification of the vague game form of the underling trust game played by stakeholders and 
firms under unforeseen contingencies. In fact, in that unforeseen events are defined as fuzzy 22 
 
sets, understood as application domains (sets) for principles of behaviour (corresponding to  
VWUDWHJLHVFRQWLQJHQWRQXQIRUHVHHQVWDWHVWKHSOD\HUV¶SD\RIIVDWWDFKHGWRMRLQWVWUDWHJLHV
can be modelled in a similar way. Because these payoffs are functions of unforeseen events, 
they could become vague variables. For simplicity, however, I set this point aside for the 
moment by assuming that, even if in a vague way, players have a fairly good understanding of 
the  payoff  space  of  the  constitutional  choice  game  as  a  set  of  outcomes  each  associated 
(vaguely to a certain degree) with (many) possible constitutions (subset of the initial strategy 
space) (Kreps, 1990; Zimmermann, 1991; Sacconi, 2000, 2007).    
 
3.2   7KH³VWDWHRIQDWXUH´JDPH   
Having  assumed  that  the  constitutional  choice  is  about  rights  and  restrictions  on  the 
admissible sets of free actions and their outcomes, where do these actions and outcomes come 
IURP"7KHDQVZHULVLQSDUWIURPWKH³VWDWHRIQDWXUH´0DQ\RIWKHSRVVLEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
outcomes,  based  on  the  use  of  some  action  capabilities  by  players,  are  state-of-nature 
outcomes virtually already possible in the case that these action were adopted. They are not 
all  state-of-nature  possible  outcomes  simply  because,  in  the  constitutional  phase,  we  can 
devise many intermediate cooperation modes that we did not appreciate in the rough picture 
of our actions opportunity in the state of nature(for example, the opportunity to randomize 
between two possible agreements). Nevertheless, most of these outcomes and strategy profiles 
were already possible in the state of nature.   
Thus before the constitutional game is played, we must consider the state-of nature-game GN. 
This is a generic game with a finite number of players (at least two) and any finite number of 
pure strategies, which is a generalised form of PD or social dilemma. In this game, players 
have any degree of liberty allowing them to cooperate or act favourably toward each other, or 
to defect from any degree of cooperation, cheating and using offensive or defensive action 
one against the other. The salient aspect of this game is that players (without any constraint or 
obstruction, external or internal, physical, legal or motivational) are able to resort to any level 
RI³QDWXUDO´OLEHUW\$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHRQO\HTXLOLErium point in this game played as a one 
shot-game  is  a  combination  of  pure  strategies  d*  that  represents  an  extremely  poor  and 
mutually unprofitable state of interaction in which  they do not restrain in any significant way 
activities  aimed  at  appropriating  other  natural  endowments.  Not  only  are  they  unable  to 
cooperate, but the logic of choice induces them to adopt actions able to steal any benefits 
from the counterparty if s/he is ready to act kindly toward them. As a matter of fact, this is a 23 
 
+REEHVLDQ³VWDWHRIQDWXUH´ ZLWK DQXQLTXHHTXLOLEULXPVROXWLRQ ZKHUHLQ WKHFRQGXFW RI
SOD\HUV¶UHFLSURFDOEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVUHQGHUWKHLUOLYHV³solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short". It has to be understood as a market interaction characterized by any sort of contract 
failure  and  incompleteness  leading  to  very  high  transaction  costs  which  makes  almost 
impossible to attain  in equilibrium mutually advantageous exchanges.  
The outcome space PN of the state-of-nature game GN is shown in fig. 5. This includes a large 
number  of  discrete  outcomes  because  it  represents  many  possible  levels  of  mutual  or 
unilateral cooperation and defection, friendly or aggressive attitudes in the conduct of many 
business activities by the two players. What matters in this representation is that the unique 
equilibrium point is interior to the payoff space, which is pushed toward the origin (in order to 
avoid the extreme but not completely unreasonable possibility that they may also get negative 
payoffs in the one-shot version of this gamHEXWDVLQ+REEHV¶VWDWHRIQDWXUHLVHTXDOO\EDG







3.3   7KH³DOOSRVVLEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQV´JDPH 
Let  us  move  from  this  payoff  space  to  the  constitutional  choice-game  GC  payoff  space.  
Firstly, the GC RXWFRPHVSDFH3FRQVLVWVRIWKHV\PPHWULFDOµVWDWHRIQDWXUH¶HTXLOLEULXPG*, 
taken  as  the  status  quo  where  the  game  would  remain  if  the  players  were  incapable  of 






UHDFKLQJ DQ\ DJUHHPHQW SOXV WKH RWKHU µVWDWH RI QDWXUH¶ SRVVLEOH Rutcomes  and  all  their 
(convex)  combinations  as  outcomes  of  possible  enforceable  agreement.  This  means  that 
agreements  on  constitutions  can  generate  all  the  outcomes  that  were  previously  only 
³YLUWXDOO\´SRVVLEOHDQGDOVRDOOWKHLUFRQYH[FRPELQDWLRQVWKDW were not allowed in the state 
of nature. In fact, the state of nature is a non-cooperative game, whilst the GC is a cooperative 
bargaining game. Given any pairs of pure joint strategies (each corresponding to a profile of 
individual pure strategies), a cooperative game admits joint randomisations on such pairs that 
generate jointly randomized joint strategies or (to put it differently) mixed joint strategies as 
additional possible agreements of the bargaining game. Such jointly mixed joint strategies are 
effective in this game because any joint strategy (pure or mixed) can be enforced. That is, 
given agreements on two pure strategy combinations, a randomizing mechanism may dictate 
which of the two will be implemented without fear of individual defection from the selected 
combination. This defines the outcome space of GC as, at least, the convex hull of the state-of-
nature game  outcomes. 
A legitimate question is how the  cooperative game GC could ever emerge from the non-
cooperative GN. The answer is that GC LVD³WKRXJKWH[SHULPHQW´WKDWSOD\HUVPD\FRQGXFWDW
any time when, in order to devise a justifiable escape to the sub-optimality of GN solution d*, 
they are willing to suppose that a solution can be given by agreement - i.e. by admitting that 
they are able to subscribe to whatever agreement without the fear that any player (him/herself 
included) may fail to comply with it. Hence, in moving forward form the state of nature game 
GN to the constitutional choice game GC it is not necessary to assume that the underlying real 
world situation is substantially changed. Simply, we assume that players may  frame it as 
different games. Firstly, as a non-cooperative game GN. Secondly, as a cooperative bargaining 
game GC generated form the same physical action set and possible outcome set as GN but with 
DPDMRUIUDPLQJGLIIHUHQFHWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW³ZKDWHYHUDJUHHPHQWLVUHDFKHGE\SOD\HUV
FDQEHDXWRPDWLFDOO\HQIRUFHG´7KLVFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVWDNLQJDGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHRU
point of view on the game,  starting IURPWKHTXHVWLRQ³ZKDWFRQVWLWXWLRQZRXOGZHfairly 
DJUHHJUDQWHGWKDWRXUDJUHHPHQWVZHUHHQIRUFHDEOH"´ZKLFKHQWDLOVDFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQW
but internally consistent frame of the game with respect to the case of GN.  
However, this different framing of the situation allows to enlarge the outcomes space even 
further. %HFDXVHWKHSOD\HUVDUHFRQVLGHULQJ³DOOWKHSRVVLEOH´FRRSHUDWLYHDJUHHPHQWVWKHLU
imaginations  must  not  be  limited  by  their  real-life  power  relations.  They  can  decide  to 
subscribe to whatever terms of agreement. This introduces a second step in the definition of 25 
 
the  outcome  space  of  the  constitutional  choice  game  ±  i.e.  assuming  that  the  GC  game 
outcome  space  is  in  general  symmetrical  and  convex  for  whatever  configuration  of  the 
outcome space of the basic state-of-nature game GN. As far as symmetry is concerned, we 
proceed  as follows. Players considering all the logically possible agreement, given a basic 
state-of-nature outcomes set, can account not just for all the probabilistic mixtures of possible 
DJUHHPHQWV3EXWDOVRIRUWKRVHUHVXOWLQJIURPDV\PPHWULFWUDQVODWLRQ3¶RIWKHRXWFRPHV
space with respect to the Cartesian utility axes, i.e. from the idea that they can also agree to 
H[FKDQJHHDFKRWKHU¶VSRVLWLRQVZLWKUHVSHFWWRDQ\SRVVible agreement directly accounted for 
by outcomes of the basic game. Recall that GC derives from GN DVD³WKRXJKWH[SHULPHQW´
intended to devise a justifiable agreement enabling the players to escape from the suboptimal 
equilibrium d* of GN The need for justification (or impartial justification) is what entails that 
the  GC  outcome  space  accounts  for  not  just  the  convex  combinations  of  the  basic  game 
possible outcomes, but also for the symmetric  translation of these outcomes with respect the 
Cartesian axes UHSUHVHQWLQJWKHSOD\HUV¶XWLOLW\SD\RIIV2QFHDOOWKHVHSRVVLELOLWLHVKDYHEHHQ
taken in account, also all the linear combinations among all the resulting symmetrical points 
are allowed, so that the space is also convex as in standard  cooperative bargaining game 
theory.  What results is a convex symmetrical outcome space P resulting from the more basic 
outcome space P1 (see fig. 6). Note that because the status quo d* was already on the bisector, 
it remains unvaried under the payoff space translation (otherwise we would have taken as the 
relevant  status  quo  the  convex  combination  of  the  original  one  and  its  symmetrical 
translation).     
Note that because the status quo d* was already on the bisector, it remains unvaried under the 
payoff space translation (otherwise we would have taken as the relevant status quo the convex 
combination of the original one and its symmetrical translation).   As we already know, the 
distinctive feature of the constitutional choice game is that it seeks a solution understood as an 
optimal (in a sense to be clarified) subset of the possible agreements in GC. Players simply 
choose a subset Ii of the joint strategies set I admissible in GC. Each subset of the GC strategies 
VSDFHLVDOLPLWDWLRQRQWKHSOD\HUV¶FKRLFHIUHHGRP7KXVthe choice of any subset coincides 
ZLWKWKHFKRLFHRIDµFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶(DFKVXEVHWFRQVWLWXWLRQLQWXUQGHILQHVDFRRSHUDWLYH
sub-game  Gi whose outcome space Pi is a subset of the outcome space P of GC . These sub-




As we already know, the distinctive feature of the constitutional choice game is that it seeks a 
solution understood as an optimal (in a sense to be clarified) subset of the possible agreements 
in GC. Players simply choose a subset Ii of the joint strategies set I admissible in GC. Each 
subset of the GC VWUDWHJLHVVSDFHLVDOLPLWDWLRQRQWKHSOD\HUV¶FKRLFHIUHHGRP Thus, the 
FKRLFHRIDQ\VXEVHWFRLQFLGHVZLWKWKHFKRLFHRIDµFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶(DFKVXEVHWFRQVWLWXWLRQ
in turn defines a cooperative sub-game  Gi whose outcome space Pi is a subset of the outcome 
space P of GC . These sub-games may be understood as post-constitutional coalition games in 
which  the  players  negotiate  on  how  much  they  obtain  from  cooperation  according  their 
³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWV´+HQFHHDFKSRVW-constitutional sub  game Gi is  constrained by the 
constitution (its set of possible strategies) chosen in GC. Formally, the outcome space P of the 
constitutional choice game GC is the union of all its possible subsets P1«3n (see fig. 7 for a 
case where seven payoff subspaces of P are represented), and the decision problem in GC 








3.4   A backward-induction solution of constitutional choice as a sequential game   
How must the best constitutions be identified? Recall that even if the constitution is selected 
as a set of joint strategies, nevertheless, for each sub game constrained by a specific strategy 
set,  we  assumed that from  the constitutional  point of view players may learn the unique 
bargaining solutions of the post-constitutional games. They thus use this information to select 
the best constitution. Every outcome sub-set reduces to the unique outcome coinciding with 
the sub-game solution relative to that particular sub-set, and these solutions are compared in 
terms of the relevant constitutional property.   
As a whole, this amounts  to saying that  players  take part in a sequential game in two steps 
so  that  the  constitutional  contract  can  be  worked  out  by  backward  induction.  Given  the 
complete description of all the possible sub-games, players start to solve the game from its 28 
 
second  step,  i.e.  by  solving  each  post-constitutional  game  Gi  defined  for  each  possible 
constitution  (each  possible  subset  of  the  outcome  space).  Given  each  sub-game 
hypothetically, the players calculate the payoff assigned to them by the Shapley value, which 
is the relevant solution concept for n person cooperative coalition games 
  
Vi = ¦ [(s-1)!(n-s)!/ n!] [v(S) ± v(S-^i`)] 
  S 
(note that in two-SOD\HUEDUJDLQLQJLQ ZKLFKWKHFRDOLWLRQVWUXFWXUHUHGXFHV WR WKH ³VROR-
FRDOLWLRQV´DQGWKH³WRWDO-FRDOLWLRQ´RIWZRSOD\HUVWKLVUHGXFHVWRWKH1DVKEDUJDLQLQJJDPH 
WDNLQJWKH³VROR-FRDOLWLRQ´DVWKHVWDWXVTXRG
)RUHDFKVXEJDPH*i there is thus a well-
defined solution Vi of the coalition problem  such that  Vi t d*. Then, moving backwards, the 
players solve the first-stage constitutional choice game. Because the GC solution is  a social 
contract, it must be the unanimous choice of a unique constitution by all the members of S. If 
this agreement is not reached, players are doomed to SOD\WKHXQSURILWDEOHµVWDWHRIQDWXUH¶
game with solution d*. Since GC is a typical cooperative bargaining game, the most accredited 
solution is the Nash bargaining solution (N.B.S), which follows from different sets of very 
general rationality postulates (Nash, 1950; Harsanyi±Zeuthen, 1977)  
  Max 3i(Ui ±d*i) 
   ViI 
 
In GC the  N.B.S must be found within the symmetrical outcome space P generated by the 
power-set  I of all the logically possible subsets of the strategies set I of GC itself. All the 
points in this space are understood as being solutions for possible post-constitutional games. 
What is remarkable is that this payoff space P is the same as the payoff space P assigned to 
GC  when  seen  as  a  bargaining  game  directly  played  on  possible  agreement  concerning 
specific joint strategies included in the set I. The N.B.S hence selects a constitution such that 
the relevant post-constitutional game will distribute equal parts of the cooperative surplus 
calculated  with  respect  to  the  entire  GC  outcome  space  P  (=  P).  In  other  words,  the 
constitution  chosen  in  GC  will  have  a  post-constitutional  solution  coinciding  with  the 
maximization of the Nash bargaining product also relative to P. In our example (where for 
simplicity we exemplify only seven subsets of P), the selected constitution is identified by the 




3.5  Distributive justice interpretation     
The sequential bargaining game solution can be given an intuitive ethical interpretation not 
only because of the symmetrical shape of the bargaining game, but also on the basis of the 
correspondence between each of the two concepts of solution that I have employed and the 
intuitive principle of justice appropriate to the respective bargaining phase in question. The 
solution to each post-constitutional game according to the Shapley value can be interpreted as 
an application of the principle of  remuneration on  the basis of  relative  contribution. The 
Shapley value is in fact the linear combination (weighted with equal probability assigned to 
all the coalitions with the same number of members) of  the marginal contributions that an 
individual can make to all the coalitions. On the other hand, the Nash bargaining solution ± 
provided that the units of measure for the individual utilities are assumed to be interpersonally 
calibrated (which is not required for simple calculation of the Nash bargaining solution) ± can 
be interpreted as an equivalent solution to the distribution proportional to relative needs, that 
is,  proportional  to  the  relative  intensity  of  marginal  utility  variations  comparison  for  the 
players at the point where the solution falls. In fact  the ratio in which the shares of the surplus 
are distributed under the Nash bargaining solution is proportional to the ratio between the 
PDUJLQDOYDULDWLRQVLQWKHSOD\HUV¶XWLOLWLHVwU1/wU2 =  ± a1/a2. Thus, once the utility units 
have  been  interpersonally  calibrated,  so  that  each  unit  expresses  the  same  magnitude  of 
preference  for  both  the  players,  the  ratio  between  their  marginal  variation  measures  the 
SOD\HUV¶UHODWLYHQHHGVDWWKHVROXWLRQSRLQWVHH%URFN, 1979; Sacconi  1991, 2000, 2006b). 
The  twofold  distributive  justice  characterisation  of  the  bargaining  solutions  matches  the 
different  nature  of  the  problems  of  collective  choice  modelled  by  the  post-constitutional 
games, on the one hand, and the constitutional choice game GC on the other. Before the parties 
play a post-constitutional sub-game, they undertake their specific investments bearing in mind 
the guarantees offered by the constitution in regard to their possibilities of reaping the benefits 
of cooperation. They then calculate the effect  of their participation in  each possible sub-
coalition of S, and finally contract with S the part due to them for concluding an agreement 
which will enable S to pursue its best joint strategy, associated with which is a super-additive 
production function (or characteristic function). The solution of each sub-game distributes 
benefits to which the players have already contributed through their investment decisions and 
through  their  decision  to  join  the  coalition  S.  Therefore  appropriate  at  this  point  is  the 
distribution criterion based on relative contribution or, put otherwise, relative merits.  Instead, 
in the case of the constitutional bargaining game GC, none of the parties subscribing to the 30 
 
agreement has yet contributed anything, so that the merit or relative contribution criterion 
does not seem to be a valid criterion of distributive justice in this case. Chosen in GC is the 
constitution on the basis of which the investment decisions will be taken. What the various 
players will be willing to contribute depends on which constitution is chosen. These rights-
for-incentives, however, must be incorporated into an agreement among participants in the 
constitutional bargaining phase which considers only what is relevant from their current point 
of view. In the absence of any relevance of merit, in this case only needs can matter for the 
SOD\HUV¶DJUHHPHQW+HQFHDQDSSURSULDWHFULWHULRQIRUWKHVROXWLRQZLOOUHIHUWRWKHrelative 
needs of the parties in regard to what will subsequently enable them to contribute to joint 
production. 
 
3.6  Dealing with exclusive property rights        
Thus  far  every  logically  possible  constitution  for  the  productive  organisation  has  been 
considered as equally feasible. This case can be called  Utopian, because any constitutional 
GHVLJQFDQEHGHYLVHGRXWE\WKHSOD\HUV¶LPDJLQDWLRQVZLWKRXWDQ\FRQVWUDLQW in terms of 
³LQVWLWXWLRQDOIHDVLELOLW\´7KLVDPRXQWVWRVD\LQJWKDWIRUH[DPSOHSURSHUW\ULJKWVPD\EH
allotted amongst players as if they were a continuous variable based on some qualitative 
object or property (i.e. control over a good or an action) indefinitely divisible amongst them, 
so that rights can be distributed in whatever proportion among all the players. Non-separable 
discrete objects are completely excluded in this case.   
However, more realistic is the hypothesis that only certain kinds of restrictions (constitutions) 
on the set of all the possible joint strategies of GC DUH³LQVWLWXWLRQDOO\IHDVLEOH´6SHFLILFDOO\
RQO\³H[FOXVLYH´DOORFDWLRQVRISURSHUW\ULJKWVRQDOOWKHSK\VLFDODVVHWVRIWKHILUPPD\EH
institutionally  feasible.  For  example,  control  structures  could  allow  the  assignation  of 
authority (residual decision rights) to some party or another, but not any intermediate or equal  
degrees of authority to all parties - understood as whatever splitting of the same decision right 
on  the  very  same  asset.  (Note,  however,  that  this  does  not  imply  that  other  rights 
combinations are impossible, for example ones complementing a residual decision right held 
by a party with a responsibility or an accountability duty owed to those who do not hold that 
right).  If these indivisibilities are admitted,  the  N.B.S. relative to  the all-inclusive payoff 
space of GC may not coincide with the solution of any of the institutionally feasible sub-
games, since the choice must fall within the set of institutionally feasible solutions, which will 
not coincide with the entire payoff space P.  31 
 
$UHDVRQDEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVWKDW³UHDOLVP´FRQVWUDLQVGHVLUDEOHQRUPDWLYHSURSHUWLHVVXFKDV
ideal social efficiency and fairness. (In fact it is a standard assumption in transaction cost 
economics that governance and authority costs entail that any whatever  governance structure 
is  second-best.  Moreover,  we  know  that  this  occurs  because  of  abuse  of  authority  and 
unfairness under each exercise of ownership as an exclusive right). Thus feasible sub-games 
are assumed to have outcome spaces that coincide with  only a few of the proper subsets of 
the all-encompassing outcome space P. The resulting candidate set of constitutions (deriving 
from the post-constitutional solutions of feasible sub games) is defined as a set of second-best 
solutions with respect to the outcome space P. 
Consider a two-players case (see fig. 8).  There is one feasible constitution G1 (which assigns 
ownership to player 1) with payoff space P1, whose solution is more efficient than that of the 
alternative feasible constitution G2 with payoff space P2 (which assigns ownership to player 
2). Since these constitutions give complete control to one player or another, but not to both, it 
is natural that such constitutions should also assign a significant advantage to owners in terms 
of the surplus shares that they may appropriate. Assume that there  are not other institutionally 
feasible constitutions of the control structure in terms of property rights allotment. Both the 
feasible constitutions have second-best solutions with respect to the all-encompassing space 
P.  Efficiency  is  here  understood  as  proximity  to  the  Pareto  frontier,  i.e.  how  large  the 
aggregate  surplus  is  under  the  two  ownership  allocations.  In  ex  post  efficiency  terms, 
ownership should be given to  player 1 (which  entails availability of  a Kaldor-Hicks  side 
payment that would allow a shift from one solution to the other but not vice versa).  However, 
under the G1 game we may predict a significant level of abuse of authority by player 1 as s/he 
appropriates an unjustly large share of the surplus. Why should player 2 agree to such a 
control structure? 
The only way to legitimize such an inequality into the distribution of property rights by ex 
ante agreement is for player 1 to render it acceptable from the ex ante perspective also to 
player 1, who will be disadvantaged under such a control structure. Player 1 must then take 
DFFRXQWRISOD\HU¶VFODLPVDQGFRPSHQVDWHKLPKHUIRUWKHSURVSHFWLYHDEXVHRIauthority 
and injustice that s/he will sXIIHUXQGHUSOD\HU¶VFRQWURO The agreed control structure must 
then provide for player 1 a constitutional commitment to implement a utility side payment 
drawn from the surplus that s/he will appropriate under his/KHUFRQWURORIWKHILUP¶VDVVHWVDQG
WUDQVIHUUHGWRSOD\HUWKHXWLOLW\VLGHWUDQVIHUZLOOFRQWLQXHXQWLOSOD\HU¶VIDLUFODLPRI32 
 
redress has been satisfied so that the most efficient control form is accepted by unanimous 
agreement.  
But what is the fair and efficient amount of the side utility transfer form 1 to 2?  
The problem is that at first glance we do not have a Pareto convex frontier along which the 
players can move until they reach a mutually acceptable bargain. But we can provide it by 
construction  as  follows.  There  are  two  payoff  spaces,  each    relative  to  an  institutionally 
feasible constitution (set of strategies).  
 
The constrained constitutional imaginations of the players can be simply used to allow  any 
convex combination of each pair of possible agreements, where one agreement in each pair 
belongs to a different feasible strategy set respectively. In particular, we focus on all the 
convex combinations of the two post-constitutional sub-game solutions and interpret such 
convex combinations as random mechanisms implementing each of the two solutions with 
given probabilities. The set of all these convex combinations defines the relevant north-east 
frontier of the payoff space P3 worked out by taking the convex hull of outcomes belonging 
to spaces P1 and P2 associated with the feasible constitutions. The rational utility side transfer 
is  identified  by  the  point  where  NBS  is  maximised  along  the  north-east  frontier  of  the 33 
 
outcome space  P3. In order to allow the acceptance of the solution reachable under sub-game 
G1,  player 1 must then ex ante commit him/herself to transferring to player 2 an ex post side-
payment  such that the surplus  shares  will be equal  to  those that will maximise the NBS 
calculated with respect to P3 (see again fig. 8), which is the same as allowing an appropriate 
random mechanism to make the choice between the two relevant sub-game solutions.  
Thus, even in the context of this reduced set of feasible constitutions, we can identify a unique 
VROXWLRQ IRU WKH ILUP¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ  the  most  efficient  control  structure  plus  the mutually 
acceptable (from the constitutional perspective) level of redress for the disadvantaged party.    
 
3.7   Institutional feasibility  
Institutional feasibility, as  I have implicitly understood it in the previous subsection, is a 
twofold condition: 
a)  ,QVWLWXWLRQDO IHDVLELOLW\ PHDQV ³D FRQVLVWHQW PDQQHU WR LQWURGXFH FRQVWUDLQWV RQ WKH
FRPSOHWHSOD\HUV¶QDWXUDOFDSDELOLWLHVWRDFW´KHOGE\VRPHRUDOORIWKHPDQGWKXVWR
DVVLJQGLIIHUHQWSOD\HUV¶ULJKWVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV+HUH³FRQVLVWHQW´PXVWEHXQGHUVWRRG
not in a pure mathematical sense but in terms of compatibility with our best knowledge 
about norms, institutions and legal orders as matter of facts and values.   
For example assigning ownership - residual right of control - to all the interested stakeholders 
in the same measure, or giving each of them the same right, could be inconsistent with facts 
about the non-divisibility of assets or rights over some assets. By contrast, allotting control 
rights so  that one stakeholder is  given the right  to  take residual  decisions,  while another 
stakeholder  is  given  protection  against  some  extreme  form  of  that  decision,  could  be 
³FRQVLVWHQW´ So that the latter is given the following rights: (i) to ask the first stakeholder to 
DFFRXQWIRUKLVGHFLVLRQDQGLLWREHUHGUHVVHGXQGHUFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQV7KH³LPSRVVLELOLW\
RIVRFLDOFKRLFH´Arrow, 1951) is an example of inconsistency-related to certain mechanisms 
of collective choice that presupposes certain decisiRQULJKWVRIWKHVRFLHW\¶VPHPEHUVSOXV
ethical and structural assumptions concerning the mechanism that represents some facts and 
values  about  social  choice.  More  in  general,  institutional  consistency  requires  us  to  have 
discovered an institutional arrangement consistently describable in our normative language 
and which can prescribe the allocation of decision rights and responsibility among the players 
that does not clash with our best knowledge of the subject matter. One might say that the 
highly fine-tuned and continuous allotments of decision rights entailed formally by taking as 
the basis for the constitutional choice all the logically possible subsets of the payoff space P is 34 
 
not institutionally feasible because we still have not designed in practice a plausible legal 
order able to allot legal rights in this continuous and fine-tuned mode. Thus, whereas in the 
mathematical model we may think of infinite subsets of the outcome space P, and we can 
think  of  moving  from  one  subset  to  another  by  a  continuous  marginal  change  in  the 
distribution of rights, on the contrary, within the language of institutions, we may only face a 
description of discrete objects permitting only rough divisions into discrete ³pieces of rights´ 
held on such objects. Some rights can be indivisible and not sharable, whereas they can be 
counteracted by different rights, also indivisible but consistently able to curtail the first right 
abuse. Even if this second institutional structure may be consistent, there is no reason to say 
that it does not entail a loss in terms of ideal efficiency and fairness. Indeed, the perfect 
divisibility of property rights would give a perfect modulation of investment incentives to all 
the players in proportion to the importance of these investments for social surplus production, 
whereas the feasible arrangement may be less fine-tuned to this purpose. Moreover, it is fairly 
obvious that institutional feasibility, by requiring the assignation of authority to one party and 
submission to the authority of another party, has unequal payoff distributions.  
b)  Institutional  feasibility  entails  a  sufficient  level  of  effectiveness,  i.e.  a  control  and 
governance structure which can be intended as a protection of  some rights or interests is 
feasible only if it can be put into practice effectively.  
This condition has various interpretations. The most obvious one is to equate effectiveness 
with  self-interested  incentive  compatibility  in  the  pure  game-theoretical  sense.  Thus  the 
agreed solution should be required  to correspond to a pre-existing equilibrium point in the 
underlying game (the state of nature) which implements the agreement. However, in our case 
-  where the state of nature is  seen as  a one-shot  game  - this  interpretation cannot  work, 
because only the status quo d* corresponds to a pre-H[LVWLQJHTXLOLEULXPSRLQWRIWKH³VWDWHRI
QDWXUH´JDPH$SRVVLEOHZD\WRLQWURGXFHWKLVW\SHRIHIIHFWLYHQHVVZRXOGEHWRDVVXPHWKDW
GN is an infinitely repeated game, so that each one-shot game outcome may be reached in 
equilibrium as the average payoff of an appropriate combination of repeated strategies.  
Nevertheless, the use of this strict notion of incentive compatibility is not necessary in order 
to account for institutional effectiveness. As an alternative explanation, consider only those 
constitutions  which  define  allotments  of  decision  rights  such  that  a  bargaining  sub-game 
within these agreed constitutional constraints is supported by motivations sufficiently strong 
to induce players to stay within the limits of that agreement. In other words, effectiveness 
comes about if the constitution distributes rights and action opportunities in such a way that 35 
 
players in the corresponding sub-game will reach agreements that are effective causal factors 
in  inducing  intrinsic  motivations  to  implement  that  same  agreement.  The  difference,  of 
course,  is  in  the  role  that  constitutions  as  such  may  play  in  generating  incentives  and 
motivations that are effective in the implementation phase There is no need to make a choice 
between these two interpretations at this stage (however this line of thoug will be undertaken 
in Part II of this essay, see Sacconi 2010c).   
7KXVIDUZHFDQPDLQWDLQWKDWHIIHFWLYHQHVVLVDFRQVWUDLQWRQWKH³DOOSRVVLEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQV´
set P, so that only proper subsets are feasible (which entails that the effective constitutions 
outcome spaces are proper subsets of the all-encompassing space P, and because these subsets 
will not include the north-east boundary of space P, in general they are quite obviously second 
best in terms of efficiency). However, it is not obvious what this means in term of fairness.   
 
4  Difficulties in the constitutional contract of the firm  
 
Constitutions are not simply logically possible but also institutionally feasible if their design 
LV³FRQVLVWHQW´DQGVRPHPHFKDQLVPDEOHWRFDUU\RXWWKHLUFRQVWLWXWLRQDODJUHHPHQWH[LVWV
The  mechanism  may  be  of  any  nature,  internal  or  external,  legal,  social,  moral  or 
psychological. Simply, there must be positive inducements or negative sanctions (internal or 
external, material or psychological) able to induce individuals to comply with the agreement, 
which may operate through the legal system, the social acceptance mechanism, or through 
internal motivations like moral sentiments, the sense of moral obligation, or the belief that 
God will condemn us to hell.  
That assumption was implicitly made when the idea of an ex ante grand social contract on the 
constitution of the firms was introduced, and which was admitted to be about all the logically 
possible institutional arrangements of the control structure and other legal rights. Then, by 
dealing with exclusive property rights alone, I have simply constrained this hypothesis to hold 
only for a subset of the logically possible institutions, i.e. for the subsets in which property 
rights are exclusively assigned to one or another stakeholder. This intentionally makes the 
problem  of  designing  a  multi-stakeholder  control  structure  of  the  firm  more  realistic  and 
serious, because we cannot now rely on an all-encompassing institutional structure in which 
every stakeholder is granted an equal proportion of control rights. Hence we need to define 
the redress duties or responsibilities owed to those stakeholders that cannot share rights of 
control.   36 
 
In the context of the theory of the firm, this line of reasoning could be pursued without too 
many  difficulties,  because  some  parts  of  the  institutional  system  can  be  presumed  to  be 
already  enacted before the social contract of the firm occurs. Hence it is admissible that at 
least some institutional arrangements that are deliberate through the social contract of the firm 
may also be externally enforced by some other mechanism (social or legal) which pre-exists 
the firm itself. Nevertheless, I do not want to rely too much on these presumptions, because 
the  basic  thesis  of  this  essay  is  that  the  CSR  model  of  corporate  governance  is  self-
enforceable, and hence can rest primarily on endogenous forces.  
7KHTXHVWLRQPXVWWKHQEHDVNHGRI³KRZVHOI-sustaining is a solution that,  given two feasible 
arrangements of property rights, defines a side-payment from the owner to the non-owner in 
order to redress the abuse of authority that will take place under each feasible institutional 
VWUXFWXUHRIFRQWURO"´5HFDOOWKDWWKHH[DFWGLPHQVLRQ of this side-payment was identified 
through  the  construction  of  a  small-scale  constitutional  choice  problem,  i.e.  the  convex 
combination  of  the  two  sets  of  outcomes  admitted  by  the  outcome  space  of  the  two 
institutionally feasible sub-games, and by the straight line joining their NBS. In other words, 
this implies resolving the problem of collective choice within the linear combination of the 
two bargaining solutions, one for each sub-game.  
But we must now address a problem: this linear combination does not necessarily satisfy the 
same assumptions  that we made for the two institutionally feasible sub-games. Hence its 
agreed solution on the north-east frontier of the convex combination of their payoffs spaces 
does not need to be feasible. How can we deal with this difficulty? And must a proper escape 
from  the  feasibility  problem  compromise  the  request  for  fairness  and  accordance  with 
intuitive principles of justice in the constitutional choice on control structures? Of course, any 
successful attempt to solve this difficulty will contribute essentially to the very basis of the 
idea that CSR is a governance system not externally imposed by the law but implementable as 
a  self-enforceable  social  norm  incorporating  the  normative  requirements  of  contractarian 
ethics.  To be sure of the relevance of these questions, let us look at the institutionally feasible 
solution more carefully, with the aid of some geometry (see Fig. 9).  
Fig.  9  shows  a  line  segment  joining  points  S1  and  S2  and  that  represents  the  linear 
combination of the two bargaining solutions relative to subspaces P1 and P2 respectively. 
Along this line segment, there are all the possible probabilistic combinations of S1 and S2. 
Also represented are all the possible utility side-payments which, given solution S2 - the more 
efficient one and nearest to the north-east frontier - PD\EHDJUHHGWRUHGUHVVSOD\HU¶VORVV37 
 
for agreeing to give up control over the firm. The utility transfer in L is calculated as the 
constitutional  agreement  within  P3,  i.e.  a  subset  of  the  all-encompassing  payoff  space  P, 
which  is  constructed  as  the  convex  hull  of  the  sub-game  spaces  P1  and  P2  representing 
institutionally feasible sub-games. The status quo is assumed to be at the origin. Hence, L is 
the NBS of P3, and thus is also proportional to relative needs contingent to this subspace P3. 
This last property may be seen by considering that the slope of the line segment joining S1 and 
S2 is the same, with inverse sign, as the dashed line joining the origin (status quo) and L, 
where it is incident on S1S2, which in fact is the frontier of the convex (compact) space P3.   
 
 
Two points are raised by this case:  
i)  Instability of the equitable institutional arrangement:  
The  institutional  mechanism  granting  that  player  1  will  agree  ex  ante  to  enter  a  control 
VWUXFWXUHWKDWOHJLWLPL]HVSOD\HU¶VFRQWURODQGDOVRDOORZLQJKLPWRSURILWFRQVLGHUDEO\IURP
control,  is  the utility-side payment  represented  by  L on S1S2. But  whereas  P1 and P2 are 38 
 
assumed  to  be  institutionally  feasible  sub-game  payoff  spaces,  i.e.  to  have  bargaining 
solutions that are enforced by some mechanism or motivation, the same does not hold for any 
points in P3 lying outside the union of P1 and P2. Combining points like S1 and S2 does not 
ensure  that  the  resulting  linear  combination  lies  inside  the  institutionally  feasible  set  of 
solutions. The linear combination may give rise to outcomes that are not enforceable; and this 
is exactly the case when, as for L, the point representing the optimal redress lies outside the P1 
and P2 union. What will make point L feasible? Notice that L is an ex ante social contract on 
the institutional structure of the firm which would induce the players to give their ex ante 
consent  to  entering  the  institutional  arrangement  of  the  firm.  Nevertheless,  it  does  not 
necessarily coincide with any solution of the ex post implementation problem, and is therefore 
unstable. On anticipating such instability, player 2 would not effectively endorse such an 
agreement. But then on what should they reach an agreement? 
ii)  Divorce between local and global justice.  
Global justice is represented by point G in fig. 9, where the NBS relative to space P is located. 
Here the institutional structure is arranged so that it reflects a measure of relative needs with 
respect  to  the  all-encompassing  space  of  possible  institutions  P  such  that  it  is  uniquely 
UHIOHFWHG E\ WKH 1%6¶V GLVWULEXWLRQ RI SD\RIIV 7KLV VSDFH LV SURSHUO\ XQGHUVWRRG WR EH
symmetrical in so far as any logically possible allocation and distribution of control rights is 
taken into consideration. In fact, the dashed line segment from the origin to G has the same 
slope (with inverse sign) as the tangent to the north-east boundary of P at the incidence point 
G. Because point G lies outside any institutionally feasible sub-game payoff space such as P1 
and P2, we recognize that this  solution is  merely  utopian. Nevertheless, the line segment 
joining the status quo to G represents the distributive proportion that would incorporate the 
relative needs principle with respect WRWKH³JOREDO´SD\RIIVSDFH37KHSRLQW*¶ at which this 
line  segment  crosses  the  north-east  boundary  of  P3  (incidence  point)  is  hence  a  natural 
candidate for the agreement according to the constitutional choice principles, the one that 
mostly  approximated  the  global  justice  solution  (call  it  constrained  global  justice).  Here 
payoffs are allotted so that the relative needs principle is satisfied not so much with respect 
the contingent subspace P3 as with respect to the set of possible institutional alternative P in 
general. This would be a natural requirement derived from the general theory of constitutional 
choice: select the sub-game with a payoff space such that its bargaining solution is the one 
closest to the point where NBS is maximized on the all-encompassing payoff space P.  In 
other words select a sub-game such that its own bargaining solution lies on the line segment 39 
 
joining the status quo to G, as near as possible to G (that is as mutually advantageous as 
possible).  If  there  are  no  such  sub-games,  take  as  an  acceptable  level  of  redress  to  the 
disadvantaged party the point within the convex combination of feasible subspaces that lies 
on the line segment joining the status quo to the global justice point G. By contrast, L is a 
local  justice  solution:  it  allots  payoffs  in  such  a  way  that  the  relative  needs  principle  is 
respected only with reference to the contingent subset of institutionally feasible sub-games.  
Which of the two should prevail? Intuition helps only when we consider extreme cases. Let us 
therefore concentrate on the case where local justice diverges from global justice owing to the 
asymmetrical shape of all the institutional feasible subsets and hence also to their convex 
combination. Fig. 10 illustrates this case: P is symmetric, but both its institutionally feasible 
subsets are rather asymmetrically placed in the region where player 1 always fares somewhat 
better than 2 (incidence point). In a sense, this means that only property rights assignations to 
player 1 are allowed - which gives player 1 a plain advantage - even if these regimes may be 
more or less favourable also to player 2 (i.e. they leave player 2 unprotected at different levels 
DJDLQVWSOD\HU¶VGLVFUHWLRQ:LWKLQWKLVVXEVHWRILQVWLWXWLRQVWKHVXE-game corresponding 
to the outcome space P1 has a solution nearest to the Pareto frontier of P. This means that 
there are Kaldor- Hicks side payments that allow reaching the solution P1 form the solution P2 
but not vice versa. Moreover, there is an arrangement in which player 1 partially redresses the 
imbalance in the payoff distribution generated by the most extreme form of ownership in 
favour of player 1 by a utility side-payment in favour of player 2, calculated as the bargaining 
solution within the bargaining subset P3 derived from the convex combination of P1 and P2. 
Nevertheless, this seems to be a caricature of the redress principle: the best feasible case for 
player 2 - the solution under P2 - has already asymmetrically shifted in favour of player 1. 
Indeed, drawing the convex combination of spaces P1 and P2 simply induces a compromise 
between two solutions both to the advantage of player 1; and any whatever linear combination 
RIWKHVHVROXWLRQVZLOOVKLIWWKHILQDOUHVXOWHYHQPRUHWRZDUGSOD\HU¶VDGYDQWDJHWKDQZLOO
taking the solution directly in P2. So why should player 2 not insist on the less efficient but 
nevertheless feasible solution in P2?  
Global justice here seems to prevail over the alternative. Following the straight line joining 
the status quo to the global justice solution G in P, the north-east boundary of P2 is crossed  in 
*¶%HFDXVH3LVDSHUIHFWO\V\PPHWULFSD\RIIVSDFHWKLVKDSSHQVDORQJWKHVWUDLJKW-line. 





By contrast, the locally fair solution L, located on  the north-east boundary of P3, seems 
excessively to reflect the arbitrary fact that only institutions that favour player 1 are feasible.  
Apparent realism would mistakenly suggest abandoning global justice for  local justice, but 
WKLVLVQRWWKHFDVH*¶OLHVRQWKHERXQGDU\RIWKHSD\RIIVSDFHRIDVXE-game pertaining to a 
feasible institution, while this is not the case of L, which lies outside any feasible payoff 
space. Hence proper realism would suggest proceeding the other way round, and admitting an 
allocation of control rights compatible with selecting WKHDSSUR[LPDWLRQWRXWRSLD*¶ Thus 
both the ethical intuition of distributive justice and the requirement of ex post stability seem 
WRVXJJHVWDUHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH³QRQXWRSLDQ´YHUVLRQRIWKHILUP¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWUDFW







5  The Rawlsian theory of corporate governance  and control 
 
As already discussed, for whatever (repeated) game, based on a constituent social dilemma 
game,  however  endowed  with  an  asymmetrical  equilibrium  (convex)  outcome  space,  the 
Rawls-Binmore social contract always selects a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium coinciding 
with an application of the Rawlsian maximin principle of welfare distribution. It is computed 
as the egalitarian solution within the symmetrical intersection set generated by the original 
(equilibrium) outcome space and its symmetrical translation with respect to the Cartesian 
axes, i.e. the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) computed with respect to this symmetrical 
payoff subspace.   
 
5.1   Egalitarianism and constitutional choice amongst different control and governance 
structures      
 From this general result let us return to the constitutional choice of a governance and control 
structure of the firm. Consider two different institutionally feasible subsets derived form the 
all-inclusive set of the possible governance and control structures. I interpret this hypothesis 
as stating that, by proper design of the related corporate constitutions, we find two outcome 
spaces - subsets of the all-inclusive outcome space - corresponding to non-cooperative Nash 
equilibria sets (in the sense of the Rawls ± Binmore theory). Given that such equilibria can 
only derive from the outcome space of an underlying non-cooperative game, it follows that 
we are necessarily considering constitutions whose outcomes belong as proper subsets to the 
HTXLOLEULXPVHWRIWKH³VWDWHRIQDWXUH´ game played as a repeated game. In other words, by 
proper design we are able to select outcome spaces that are different subsets of the basic 
outcome space PN of  fig.5 (according to the folk theorem, the region lying between the status 
quo d* and the north-east frontier of the convex and compact envelope of outcomes depicted 
in PN is the equilibrium set of the repeated basic game GN).  
Taking such WZRRXWFRPHVHWVDVWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWWKH³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´K\SRWKHVLVLV
introduced  with  respect  to  each  of  them  -  i.e.  the  hypothesis  that  players  consider  each 
feasible constitution from an impartial standpoint by allowing the mutual replacement of the 
roles  (and  utility  function)  that  they  play  under  each  constitution.  Not  only  is  the  basic 
outcome space symmetrically translated, but also  each feasible subset - candidate for the 
outcome space of an acceptable constitutionally sub game - must be impartially considered. 
This means that a symmetrical translation with respect to the Cartesian axes is taken for every 42 
 
candidate outcome space, and an acceptable solution is accounted for in terms of candidate 
solutions that are invariant under the symmetric translation of the respective outcome spaces.   
Hence, what we relinquish are not impartiality and empathy but only the possibility to take for 
granted the feasibility of every convex combination of feasible outcome spaces. This is a 
requirement of realism that reminds us that the implementation of whatever constitution we 
could devise by institutional imagination is constrained by feasibility. Proposition I logically  
follows.  
PROPOSITION I:  
Given any pair of feasible convex outcome sub-spaces P1 and P2, relative to a pair of 
constitutions and their respective post constitutional cooperative games, if WKH³YHLO of 
LJQRUDQFH´K\SRWKHVLVLVLQWURGXFHGEXWWKH³'XHVH[PDFKLQD´ hypothesis is rejected, 
then the Constitutional Choice selects a constitution corresponding to the bargaining 
sub-game endowed with a feasible outcome sub-space P* such that the egalitarian 
solution in P* dominates any other egalitarian solution belonging to the alternative 
feasible sub-space.  
 
More specifically, given any two feasible convex outcome sub-spaces P1 and  P2 and their 
symmetric translations P¶ and P¶, no matter how other characteristics of the relevant spaces 
are established,  
V2*>V1*    if and only if    P1 P1¶  P2P2¶     
where V* is the egalitarian solution within the respective outcome space Pi   and the order 
relation > should be understood as  strictly superior unanimous  acceptance (strong Pareto 
dominance). Thus inclusiveness of the symmetric intersection is the only property relevant to 
the constitutional choice of sub games (see fig. 11 for an example). 
From  a  purely  formal  standpoint,  this  proposition  is  fairly  trivial.  Recall  the  relation  > 
EHWZHHQSRLQWVVDQGV¶UHSUHVHQWLQJSOD\HUV¶SD\RIISDLUVRQWKH&DUWHVLDQSODQHLVstrong 
Pareto dominance LHLIV¶!VWKHQLQV¶ERWKSOD\HUV¶SD\RIIVDUHJUHDWHUWKDQLQV,IZHWDNH
WZRSD\RIIVSDFHV6DQG6¶ERWKV\PPHtric and convex, such that S  6¶6LVDSURSHUVXEVHW
RI6¶DQGWZRSRLQWVVS and V¶6¶UHVSHFWLYHO\HTXDOWRWKHloci where the bisector of the 
Cartesian plane intersects the north-HDVWIURQWLHUVRI6DQG6¶LHWKH\DUHWKHegalitarian 
solutions rHODWLYHWRVSDFHV6DQG6¶XQGHUWKHFRQGLWLRQWKDW V6¶EXWV¶S), then the 
relation V¶!V holds necessarily for these points. In fact, all points taken along the bisector 
are  strictly  increasing  toward  north-HDVW DV D IXQFWLRQ RI WKH SOD\HUV¶ SDLUV RI (identical) 43 
 
increasing payoffs. Since the two egalitarian solutions V and V¶FRLQFLGHZLWKWZRRIWKRVH
points - not identical given V¶S - they are also ordered in the same way.  
,QRWKHUZRUGVLIWZRV\PPHWULFDOSD\RIIVSDFHV6DQG6¶DUHGHILQHGVRWKat S  6¶DQGHDFK
SRLQW V¶6¶ LV D IXQFWLRQ RI WKH VDPH LQFUHDVLQJ PRQRWRQLF ±  symmetry  and  convexity 
preserving - WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIDSDLURISOD\HUV¶SD\RIIVFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRDSRLQWVS, then 
also the egalitarian solution point V¶6¶ZKLFKOLHVRQWKH bisector, will be a monotonic 
increasing transformation of the egalitarian solution point VS, which also lies on the bisector 
- that is V¶!V.  
Of course the intersection between any generic convex space and the space generated by its 
symmetrical translation with respect to the Cartesian axes is also a symmetric space. Thus, 
when many intersection sets are generated by this operation from generic convex spaces, an 
entire collection of symmetric spaces results so that they are related to each other by set 
theoretic  inclusion.  It  follows  that  Pareto-dominance  among  egalitarian  solutions,  each 
belonging to a different payoff space, is monotonically related to how much inclusive these 
symmetric intersection sets are. 
From  a  substantive  point  of  view,  however,  it  is  important  that  Pareto-dominance  only 
between  egalitarian  solutions  should  be  considered  as  the  decisive  condition  for  the 
unanimous choice of constitutions, no matter how other characteristics of the payoff spaces 
are  settled.  From  this  perspective,  the  proposition  states  that  the  level  of  unanimous 
acceptance of a constitution (and hence its outcome) dominates the level of  acceptance of 
another constitution only if its egalitarian solution is Pareto-superior to the egalitarian solution 
of the alternative, no matter what the same Pareto dominance relation states about other points 
in  the  respective  payoff  spaces.  From  sections  2  and  3  we  know  that  this  restriction  of 
unanimous acceptance to egalitarian solutions rests on a concern for impartial feasibility, i.e. 
an individual rationality criterion (equilibrium) under the hypothesis of impartiality (veil of 
ignorance), rather than for maximizing some welfare aggregate. We choose then the most 
efficient (in the Paretian sense) point within the collection of egalitarian solutions, which are 
monotonically ordered according to the inclusiveness of the respective intersection sets, since 
this  restriction  guarantees  satisfaction  of  an  ex  post  stability  condition  granted  that  the 
decision must be ex ante impartLDOO\DFFHSWDEOHXQGHUWKH³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´ 
To  illustrate  proposition  I,  consider  fig.  11.  7KH ³DOO-HQFRPSDVVLQJ´ RXWFRPH VSDFH 3
represents  all  the  logically  possible  ways  to  cooperate  on  choice  of  a  constitution.  It  is 
assumed that no equilibrium points exist that are able to implement all outcomes in P, and in 44 
 
particular there is no such equilibrium corresponding to the utopian solution U in P, i.e. its 
symmetric  NBS.  Thus  our  attention  is  restricted  to  two  subspaces  P1  and  P2,  which  are 
feasible subsets of P. These subsets are construed so that they can be also understood as 
proper subsets of the convex equilibrium space PN RIWKH³VWDWHRIQDWXUHJDPH´SOD\HGDVD
repeated game.  
 
 
Because  they  are  related  to  the  asymmetrical  space  PN  embodying  natural  inequalities 
between the two players, both spaces P1 and P2 are asymmetrical and give some advantage to 
player 2, but at different levels.  In comparison with P2, P1 is a more asymmetric outcome 
space with a cooperative solution V1 of the post-constitutional cooperative game quite near to 
the north-east frontier of P. In terms of NBS or other welfare measures, this entails that this 
post-constitutional game would produce a larger amount of aggregate utility as solution - i.e. 
compared with P and P2, the solution V1 of P1 is second-best in term of efficiency (again 
taking the utopian solution of P as the first best), even though the aggregate value is quite 
unfairly distributed. P2 on the contrary entails a cooperative solution V2 of the cooperative 45 
 
post-constitutional sub-game which is third-best in terms of efficiency. However, because its 
solution V2 lies nearer to the bisector joining the origin with the egalitarian solution U, it 
would  distribute  payoffs  in  fairer  shares.  Recall  that  according  Rawls-Binmore  theory  a 
constitution  needs  to  be  found  by  impartially  acceptable  choice.  In  other  words,  i.e.  a 
constitution must be chosen with an  invariant solution under the symmetric replacement of 
WKH SOD\HUV¶ UROHV ZKLFK DW WKH VDPH WLPH PXVW EH H[ SRVt  stable  (equilibrium).  Picking 
solution V1 or V2 as such is thus ruled out. But feasibility also debars us from any arbitrary 
operation  on  the  convex  combination  of  spaces  P1  and  P2.  So  what  properties  does 
constitutional choice impose on the final payoffs in terms of ex post distribution? And which 
outcome space corresponds to the selected constitution? 
For each feasible outcome space, fig. 11 also shows the respective symmetrical translation P1¶
and P2¶$VVXPLQJWKDWQRFRQYH[FRPELQDWLRQRI31 and P1¶ and P2 and P2¶FDQEHJHQHUDWHG
we must focus on the respective intersection sets P1ŀ31¶DQG32ŀ32¶ZKHUHLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKH
former  is a proper subset of the latter. Both intersection sets are symmetrical spaces, and have 
symmetrical  NBS  equal  to  the  egalitarian  solutions  V1*  and  V2*  belonging  to  P1  and  P2 
respectively and lying on the bisector. Both these solution are impartial because they are 
LQYDULDQWXQGHUWKHSOD\HUV¶UROHUHSODFHPHQW%XWWKH\DUHDOVRfeasible, given that all the 
SRLQWVLQFOXGHGLQWKHVHLQWHUVHFWLRQVHWVDUHHTXLOLEULXPSRLQWVRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJ³VWDWHRI
naturH´ JDPH VR WKDW DQ\ FRQYH[ FRPELQDWLRQ RI RXWFRPHV IDOOLQJ within  a  symmetric 
intersection set would be implementable in equilibrium. Any agreement within each of these 
VHWVZRXOGQRWEHUXOHGRXWE\XQIHDVLELOLW\LIRQHSOD\HU¶VUROHZHUHLQWHUFKDQJHGZLth the 
other,  since  the  resulting  agreement  would  nevertheless  be  an  equilibrium.  However,  the 
symmetrical intersection set P2ŀ32¶VWULFWO\LQFOXGHV31ŀ31¶VRWKDWWKHHJDOLWDULDQVROXWLRQ
within P2 strictly Pareto-dominates the egalitarian solution relative to P1.  
Fig. 11 shows why. The more asymmetric a payoff space and the more unequal its post-
constitutional  NBS  with  respect  to  the  available  alternative,  the  less  inclusive  is  its 
intersection  set,  and  the  less  unanimously  acceptable  (in  term  of  constrained  Pareto 
dominance) its egalitarian solution.  
Summing up, constitutional choice falls on the constitution with outcome space P2, which 
would    have  a  post-constitutional  bargaining  solution  V2  (as  far  as  the  pure  exercise  of 
ownership    and  control  rights  is  considered).  But  in  order  to  make  such  a  constitution 
impartially acceptable and at the same time to preserve its feasibility of, the constitutional 
choice requires an ex post redistribution with respect to the solution V2 belonging to P2 such 46 
 
that the egalitarian solution V2* in P2 is de facto implemented. Thus egalitarian redress of the 
disadvantaged  stakeholder  is  the  main  constitutional  constraint  on  implementation  of  the 
constitution of ownership and control rights denoted by P2. It entails maximizing the benefit 
of  player  2,  who  even  under  this  less  unfair  constitution  still  occupies  the  role  of  the 
disadvantaged player. Note that because the dominant egalitarian solution is an equilibrium of 
the underlying game, reaching an agreement on the rediVWULEXWLYHPHFKDQLVPLVQRW³ZLVKIXO
WKLQNLQJ´1RFRQVWLWXWLRQDODJUHHPHQWPD\EHDFFHSWDEOHZLWKRXWWKHH[DQWHDFFHSWDQFHRI
such  an  egalitarian  condition,  and  the  selected  egalitarian  solution  ±  admitted  that  it 
coordinates expectations also in the post-constitutional game ± is also ex post stable as it is a 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
5.2   Global justice overrides local justice 
Thus  far  we  have  been  concerned  only  with  the  instability  of  the  equitable  institutional 
arrangement problem. Let  us now turn to the second problem: the divorce between global 
DQGORFDOMXVWLFHLQWKHFKRLFHRIWKHILUP¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ7KH5DZOVLDQWKHRU\RIFRUSRUDWH
governance solves this problem because neither global justice nor local justice as such simply 
succeeds; but considerations from global justice make it possible to derive an approximation 
to global justice that always overrides local justice. In fact, the egalitarian solution is always 
on the bisector where also the global justice solution lies, and given any two different feasible 
payoff  subspaces,  and  the  symmetrical  intersection  sets  that  they  generate  with  their 
symmetric  translation,  their  egalitarian  solutions  always  stand  in  a  relation  of  monotonic 
dominance of one over the other. Thus the Pareto-dominant egalitarian solution provides the 
best feasible approximation to global justice. No room remains for considerations of local 
justice,  which  are  rebutted  simply  by  the  unfeasibility  of  the  collateral  utility  transfer 
mechanism.  
To see why, for the moment  discard the strict concern for adherence of the feasible payoff 
sub-spaces to the underlying state-of-nature equilibrium space, and allow constitutions to be 
feasible in a less constrained sense, so that effectiveness may be granted by hypothesis to 
whatever subset of the all-encompassing space P. In this light we can reconsider the cases of 






In  Fig.  12,  P1  and  P2  are  two  outcome  spaces  corresponding  to  institutionally  feasible 
constitutions such that either player 1 or player 2 is alternatively advantaged (by alternative 
assignments of exclusive property rights). Note that this presumes that feasible institutions do 
not coincide with state-of-nature equilibria, or ± put differently ± players are able to generate 
other equilibria or stable configurations of play through their institutional imaginations and 
artifice.  This  figure  also  considers  the  spaces  P1¶ DQG 32¶ UHVXOWLQJ UHVSHFWLYHO\ IURP WKH
symmetric translation of space P1 and P2 with respect to the Cartesian axes. The intersection 
between space P1 and its translation P1¶HQWLUHO\LQFOXGHVWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQEHWZHHQVSDFH32 
and  its  translation  P2¶ 7KXV LWV HJDOLWDULDQ VROXWLRQ (1  dominates  the  second  E2.  It  is 
noticeable that what was said to be a local justice solution L is no longer affordable because it 
LV LQIHDVLEOH :KDW DERXW WKH HJDOLWDULDQ VROXWLRQ *¶ SUHYLRXVO\ FDOOHG ³DSSUR[LPDWLRQ WR
JOREDOMXVWLFH´EHFDXVHLWZDVUHVLGHQWRQWKHELVHFWRUZKHUHDOVRWKHXWRSLDQVROXWLRQ8OLHV"
Even though it is Pareto-dominant over the alternatives, it is nonetheless ruled out because it 48 
 
is unaffordable due to unfeasibility. However, the Rawls-Binmore solution E1 provides a new 
second-best approximation to global justice which is compatible with feasibility.  
 
The case of fig. 13  is somewhat clearer in terms of its implications for the global VS/ local 
justice problem. We started with two feasible outcome spaces P1 and P2 both benefitting 
player 1 at different levels. This case can be regarded as one where ownership is always 
allotted to player 1, granting some degree of abuse of authority to player 1. But under the 
constitution corresponding to the outcome space P2SOD\HU¶VUHVLGXDOULJKWRIFRQWUROLV
moderately constrained. All this can be seen by looking at the respective post-constitutional 
bargaining solution annexed to the two constitutions (S1 and S2). In order to redress such 
unfairness  of  the  feasible  solutions,  the  local  justice  collateral  utility  transfer  L  and  the 
constrained global justice solution *¶GLUHFWO\EHORQJLQJWRWKHIHDVLEOHVSDFH32) have been 
proposed.  The  latter  coincides  exactly  with  the  egalitarian  solution  E  selected  by  the 
Binmore±Rawls social contract, because it was already the egalitarian solution selected by the 49 
 
incidence point of the bisector on P2 frontier, which is the most symmetrical payoff space 
among those considered here. By introducing into fig. 13 also the symmetrical translations of 
spaces P1 and P2DFFRXQWLQJIRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRILPSDUWLDOLW\DQG³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´WKH
intersection set P2ŀP2¶ results more comprehensive than P1ŀ31¶KHQFHLWVHJDOLWDULDQVROXWLRQ
is dominant. Again, the local justice solution is unaffordable because it does not belong to any 
feasible payoffs space. I do not have to deal with its anti-intuitivism  from  the distributive 
justice point of view (it redresses player 2 less than does solution S2). Feasibility already rules 
out it from the outset.   
 
6  Challenging received wisdoms 
   
Some corollaries are required to illustrate the relevance of the main proposition given in the 
previous section to the economics of institutions and in particular to the selection of the ILUP¶V
governance and control structures. They concern two typical positions playing important roles 
in the literature on institutions design: the aggregate welfare maximizer and the libertarian 
one. 
6.1   Fairness VS. Welfare? 
Consider two feasible outcome spaces  P1 and P2  such that P1  includes both  the maximal  
utilitarian solution and the best solution in terms of Kaldor- Hicks efficiency. Nevertheless, 
P2, with its symmetric translation P2¶JHQHUDWHVDQLQWHUVHFWLRQVHWZKLFKVWULFWO\LQFOXGHVWKH
intersection of P1 and its own symmetric translation P1¶7KHQDQ\UDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
choice must prefer the constitution of the firm corresponding to the outcome space P2 -  no 
matter what the efficiency properties of P1.  
Assume that the Utilitarian and Kaldor-Hicks solutions do not coincide with the egalitarian 
solution of any relevant outcome space Pi as such.  We are thus in a situation such as depicted 
by fig. 13, where the quite unequal NBS solution S1 in P1 is the also the one that satisfies both 
the foregoing welfarist conditions. Since a constitutional choice must be reached under the 
³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´DQDWXUDOZD\WRSUHVHUYHWKLVVROXWLRQwould be to take the equally 
probable lottery between this solution treated as a point belonging to  the original space P1 
and its realization under the symmetric translation in space P1¶ 
But  without  the  dues  ex  machina  assumption,  a  convex  combination  of  these  symmetric 
Utilitarian or Kaldor-Hicks solutions does not generate any  feasible outcome. On the other 
hand, the feasible intersection of P1ŀ31¶LV3DUHWR-dominated by P2ŀ32¶VRWKDW31 cannot be 50 
 
constitutionally chosen. An efficiency criterion (Pareto dominance) is then decisive for the 
unanimous acceptance of a constitution in so far as it is  restricted to comparison between 
egalitarian solutions. Hence, equity constraints efficiency. It follow that 
COROLLARY 1: Equity comes before efficiency.  
Often  the  quest  for  social  efficiency  does  not  extend  to  requiring  satisfaction  of  the 
demanding standard of utilitarianism. Many law & economics analysts are sufficiently content 
with wealth maximisation taken as a proxy for the more demanding utilitarian requirements. 
But wealth maximisation as a solution concept performs no better than the former two in the 
context  of  constitutional  choice  (for  example  in  fig.  13  the  space  P1¶V  solution  S1  also 
maximises  the  payoffs  sum  understood  in  simple  monetary  terms).  Joint  feasibility  and 
impartiality rules out wealth maximisation. Even if it may sound iconoclastic to the standard 
theorizing in law and economics, the following proposition naturally obtains.  
PROPOSITION II:  
In order to select an institutional form of corporate governance under the constraint of 
being ex post stable ± i.e. implementable by an equilibrium point ± do not bother with 
welfare maximization or its proxy, wealth maximization. Instead, look for the best 
³HJDOLWDULDQ VROXWLRQ´ LQ WKH TXDOLILHG VHQVH RI EHLQJ WKH EHVW PRQRWRQLF 1DVK
bargaining symmetric solution among those related to the symmetric intersection sets 
resulting from symmetrical translations of the outcome equilibrium sets annexed to 
feasible constitutions.  
 
Students of corporate governance may be struck by this result, which contradicts many of the 
VXEMHFW¶VEDVLFFUHGRV± as they have been extensively elaborated by, for example, Kaplow 
and Shavell 
3. Let us quote them extensively: 
³2XUDUJXPHQWIRUEDVLQJWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIOHJDOUXOHVHQWLUHO\RQZHOIDUHHFRQRPLFVJLYLQJ
no weight to notions of fairness, derives from the fundamental characteristic of fairness-based 
assessment: such assessment does not depend exclusively on the effects of legal rules on 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VZHOO-being. As a consequence, satisfying notion of fairness can make individual 
worse-off, that is , reduce social welfare. Furthermore, individuals will be made worse off 
overall whenever consideration of fairness leads to the choice of a regime different from 
which would be adopted under welfare economics because by definition the two approaches 
conflict when a regime with greater overall well-being is rejected RQJURXQGVRIIDLUQHVV´S
52). This thesis is particularly compelling because also in important and simple situations,  i.e. 51 
 
³V\PPHWULFFRQWH[WV± those in which all individuals are identically situated ± it is always the 
case that everyone will be worse off when a notion of fairness leads to the choice of different 
OHJDOUXOHIURPWKDWFKRVHQXQGHUZHOIDUHHFRQRPLFV´S 
The violation of strong Pareto optimality (choosing a rule under which everyone is worse off) 
is particularly unacceptable in such a symmetric context. In order to avoid such a risk, the 
conclusion is that no institutional regime should be chosen primarily on the basis of fairness; 
or better, fairness as an independent criterion with respect to aggregate welfare maximization 
must have no role to play in the choice of institutions. 
On the contrary, given the previous analysis, it may be shown that  
(i)  In the simplest symmetrical cases, egalitarianism and strong Pareto optimality always 
go hand in hand;  
(ii)  In most cases where only asymmetric payoff spaces are feasible, but individuals are 
V\PPHWULFDOO\VLWXDWHGE\LPSRVLWLRQRIWKH³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´ (the typical case of 
symmetric  situation  also  for  Kaplow  and  Shavell)  it  is  very  reasonable  to  put 
maximization  of  aggregate  welfare  completely  aside  in  order  to  maintain 
HJDOLWDULDQLVP ZLWKRXW DQ\ FRQWUDGLFWLRQ RI ³JHQHUDO DFFHSWDQFH´ XQGHUVWRRG DV D
strong Pareto condition;   
(iii)  Even in the special case where the legal regimes under assessment correspond to a 
feasible  payoffs  space  that  renders  egalitarianism  Pareto-dominated,  egalitarianism 
has reasonable priority over welfare maximization as the criterion for identifying the 
payoffs allocation that should be generated in order to make such a regime acceptable. 
It  constrains  Pareto  improvements  reasonably  acceptable  by  all  players  to  be 
consistent with the least deviation from perfect egalitarianism; moreover, it reasonably 
debars  players  from  reaching  solutions  of  welfare  maximization  that  would  be 
naturally acceptable if no weight were given to fairness.   
Before arguing in favor of these propositions, let us recall that Kaplow and Shavell define a 
fairness principle as an assessment criterion not consequentialist and not entirely based on 
personal well-being measures, i.e. not entirely reduciblHWRDQDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
subjective welfare perceptions annexed to consequences that happen to each individual under 
such a legal rule.
4 Thus a fairness principle is an assessment criterion Z(x) where x is a legal 
regime, or rather a state of affairs described in terms of individual actions regulated by the 
relevant regime, but not necessarily (and only) their consequences.
5  Thus Z is not reducible to 
a description of personal well-being levels or utilities and their aggregation (summation or 52 
 
multiplication or whatsoever) because it evaluates x in terms of other characteristics - for 
example, fairness, rights or duties. Egalitarianism falls within this assessment category: it 
accounts  for  the  state  x  in  terms  of  a  ratio  EHWZHHQ DJHQWV¶ SD\RIIV,  which  admittedly  
presupposes  a  description  of  personal  utilities  but  says  more.  It  states  how  equal  is  the 
proportion EHWZHHQSOD\HUV¶SD\RIIVZKDWHYHUWKH\DUHLQDEVROXWHWHUPV,WLVDrelation not 
reducible to a measure of how well individuals fare as distinct persons or as an aggregate.  
%H ZDUQHG WKDW .DSORZ DQG 6KDYHOO¶V DUJXPHQW LV WULFN\ )DLUQHVV FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DUH
accommodated  by  welfare  maximization  because  individuals  possibly  develop  a  taste  for 
fairness.
6 Thus fairness becomes an object of preference exactly like any other consequence 
or  good  whereby  it  can  be  accounted  through  the  personal  subjective  well-being  that 
individuals attach to this taste. No doubt, the formal treatment of preferences can be extended 
to make room for fairness principles as motives to act and represent them through utility 
functions (for a proper enlargement of the motives to act represented by utility functions see 
part III of this essay). But calling a taste the motivational importance that we give to adhering 
to principles is quite at odds with intuition. In fact, there is no reason to reduce preferences ± 
i.e.  binary relations expressing whatsoever betterness judgment consistent with behavior (see 
Broome, 1999) - to the idiosyncratic case of tastes.   
It is also noticeable that this immunization move entails that .DSORZDQG6KDYHOO¶VWKHRU\is 
virtually devoid of any empirical content (and perhaps paradoxical). Assume that most people 
are convinced of the view that Kaplow and Shavell wish to confute. Nearly everybody prefers 
to  assess  legal  regimes  by  fairness  principles  not  completely  dependent  on  individual 
wellbeing - for example, by using equality as a choice criterion. Since they prefer to perform 
assessments of this kind, Kaplow and Shavell would say that  the people have a taste for 
IDLUQHVVDQGKHQFHWKDWSHRSOH¶VZHOIDUHLVPD[LPL]HGE\DVVHVVLQJOHJDOUHJLPHVRQWKHEDVLV
of a criterion that gives no essential relevance to welfare maximization. Given such a social 
preference, Kaplow and Shavell would conclude that legal regimes are chosen solely on the 
basis of considerations of personal well-being and welfare maximization, even though the 
actual  assessment  of  legal  rules  accommodated  by  their  own  theory  rests  on  fairness 
principles which do not primarily refer to personal well-being. Could one say that such a 
theory is useful in any sense? Defining a different social choice rule consistent with the fact 
that individual utilities are functions (also) of fairness principles - appropriately understood as 
meDVXUHVRIWKHPRWLYDWLRQDOVWUHQJWKRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DGKHVLRQVWRIDLUQHVVSULQFLSOHV- would 
be more useful than collapsing everything into generic welfare maximization. 53 
 
+RZHYHUOHWXVVHWDVLGHWKHVHFRPPHQWVDQGWDNH.DSORZDQG6KDYHOO¶VWKHVLVDWLWVEest. 
How would it work in our context of constitutional choice on intuitional regimes of corporate 
governance and control? It is clearly irrelevant in the simplest case where only constitutions 
represented  by  symmetric  payoff  space  are  feasible.  Such  constitutions  are  increasingly 
ordered  in  terms  of  Pareto  dominance  by  inclusiveness  of  their  payoff  spaces;  and  the 
acceptability  of  their  egalitarian  solutions  monotonically  depends  on  the  inclusiveness 
ordering  defined  on  spaces.  In  this  case,  there  is  no  divorce  between  egalitarianism  and 
efficiency. Given the perfect equality of players, no reasonable bargaining theory may ask 
players to accept any solution except the symmetrical one. At the same time, the intuition that 
the solution must fall on the bisector is simply completed by the requirement that it also 
resides on the payoff frontier. As this is true under any initial symmetric feasible payoff 
space, it is also true under any symmetrical translation of the payoff space which cannot 
destroy  the  original  symmetry  of  the  situation.  In  fact,  impersonality  and  the  veil  of 
ignorance, operationalized through symmetric translation of the payoff space, map the space 
onto  itself,  generating  a  perfectly  identical  payoff  space.  Players  are  perfectly  identically 
siWXDWHGDQGVHHWKHVROXWLRQLQH[DFWO\WKHVDPHZD\XQGHUERWKWKHSOD\HUV¶UROHV6ROXWLRQ
invariance  under  symmetric  translation  of  the  payoff  space  (which  is  the  egalitarian 
requirement derived from impersonality and impartiality)  is naturally satisfied by keeping to 
the  symmetric  solution  that  already  proved  intuitive  given  the  initial  payoff  space 
representation. Even though egalitarianism is defined in term of the payoffs ratio (1/1), not a 
specific  allocation  of  any  welfare  amount,  it  is  not  inconsistent,  but  rather  perfectly 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWKµJHQHUDODFFHSWDQFH¶DV3DUHWRGRPLQDQFHEHFDXVHLWUHTXLUHVWDNLQJWKH
intersection of the bisector with  the north-east  boundary of the payoff space as uniquely 
defined solution.  
+RZHYHU.DSORZDQG6KDYHOO¶Vthesis seems rather relevant to cases where the only outcome 
spaces corresponding to feasible constitutions are asymmetrical and reflect inequalities among 
players. Players can then be identically situated with respect to the decision problem precisely 
because of the symmetrical translation of the payoff space that allows mutual  replacement  of 
their personal and position-relative points of view,  and the introduction the veil of ignorance 
in order to seek a solution which is impartial and independent from any personal perspective. 
Owing to feasibility and the  No  Deus ex machina assumption, identically situated players 
must choose the  solution from within the intersection set and pick it up on the bisector. Thus, 
in  the  case  of  two  possible  feasible  constitutions,  no  matter  what  their  further  efficiency 54 
 
properties, the one with highest egalitarian solution must be chosen - because it is identified 
by  a  monotonic  function  of  symmetrical  intersections  sets  inclusiveness.  No  doubt,  this 
solution will not generally satisfy most of the usual welfare maximization concepts, such as 
utilitarianism,  or  the  largest  Nash  bargaining  product  with  respect  to  alternative  feasible 
constitutions. Moreover, such welfarist solutions could be easily reached from the egalitarian 
solution through Kaldor-Hicks utility side-transfers that testify to the social efficiency of these 
further solutions.  
Nevertheless, there are very good reasons for not accepting these solutions instead of the best 
egalitarian  one.  These  reasons  are  feasibility  WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH ³veil  of  ignorance´ DQG
awareness that there is no Deus ex machina able to enforce any agreement that players may 
reach in the constitutional choice context. Impartiality and impersonality (underlying the veil 
of ignorance) are independent of personal well-being and they constrain the solution to be on 
the bisector. Feasibility together with the No dues ex machina hypothesis requires that such a 
solution must be reached within the intersection set. Quitting this outcome set in order to 
reach the welfare maximizing solution would simply mean that one party can impose looking 
at the solution solely from his/her point of view, because s/he is effectively the stronger player 
in the actual game of life. Conversely, looking at the solution from the perspective of the 
symmetrically translated payoff space would be considered pure wishful thinking. But the 
egalitarian  solution  within  the  intersection  set  is  also  feasible,  i.e.  it  corresponds  to  an 
equilibrium  under  both  the  payoff  spaces  representations.  Its  implementation  is  incentive 
compatible whatever personal role is taken by players. This impartial realism overrides the 
claim of the fortunate player to profit unilaterally from his strongest position. For an example 
see fig. 13, where S1 in P1 is both the utilitarian solution and the highest value of the Nash 
bargaining product among any feasible spaces; but nevertheless the chosen constitution is P2  
because its egalitarian solution is better. What about acceptability in terms of making  all 
players worse off or better off? No solution Pareto-dominates the alternative; hence there is 
QRURRPIRUDVVHUWLQJWKDWHJDOLWDULDQLVPZRUVHQVHDFKSOD\HU¶VSRVLWLRQ,WLVWUXHWKDWD
Kaldor-+LFNVXWLOLW\WUDQVIHUFRXOGLPSURYHSOD\HU¶VSRVLWLRQLI he agreed to switch from the 
egalitarian solution to S1. But why should s/he accept this change rather than any other one 
more sensitive to fairness considerations?  
In order to clarify this point, consider the third case illustrated in fig. 14, which is also the 
most  problematic  from  the  egalitarian  point  of  view.  The  feasible  payoff  space  P1  is  so 
asymmetric that by considering its translation P1¶WKHLQWHUVHFWLRQVHWLVDYHU\QDUURZUHJLRQ55 
 
of the plan and the egalitarian solution in P1ŀ31¶SURYHVWREe Pareto-dominated by S1, where 
both the maximal utilitarian solution and the maximum Nash bargaining product reside, with 
respect to any other feasible outcome. This seems to be a case where keeping to fairness 
makes every players worse off, which - according to Kaplow and Shavell - is unacceptable. In 
fact, player 1 could try to convince player 2 to relinquish egalitarianism with the reasonable 
argument that there is a mutual advantage in switching to S1. To be sure, this would entail 
also relinquishing adhesion to principles of impersonality and impartiality, because accepting 
S1  means  selecting  the  bargaining  solution  rationally  reachable  by  playing  the  post-
constitutional bargaining game related to space P1 as a separate game, without any pretence of 
choosing a solution under a veil of ignorance. But in the end, why defend impersonality and 
impartiality if these principles condemn everybody to having the worse?  
 
But  this  is  not  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  giving  egalitarianism  priority  over  welfare 
maximization  is  perfectly  reasonable  because  it  allows  mutually  acceptable  Pareto 56 
 
improvements with respect to the egalitarian solution itself. Egalitarian solutions constrain 
Pareto efficiency in so far as egalitarianism is taken to be the proper starting point from which 
acceptable Pareto improvements are calculated. This solution is the maximin point R on the 
north-east frontier of the space P1ZKHUHSOD\HU¶VSD\RIIVWKHGLVDGYDQWDJHGSOD\HUDUH
improved as much as possible, no matter what the marginal payoff improvement of player 1 
ZKR IRU HDFK SOD\HU ¶V LPSURYHPHQW REYLRXVO\ IDUHV EHWWHU WKDQ SOD\HU  KLPKHUVHOI
According to this solution, Pareto improvements with respect to E are achieved by moving 
along the frontier of P1, and they end as soon as no better improvement in player 2 payoff is 
possible. This solution dominates E, but it makes sense only because E is taken to be the 
appropriate status quo from which the Pareto improvements process is started.  
Assume  that  E  is  initially  accepted  owing  to  impersonality  and  impartiality  seen  as 
independent  (from  personal  well-being)  conditions,  under  the  additional  assumptions  of 
feasibility and No Dues ex machina. Then, player 1 proposes to player 2 a switch from E to S1 
for reasons of mutual advantage. Player 2 can reply that it is also unfair not to consider the 
alternative Pareto-dominant solution S1¶WKDWZRXOGDGYDQWDJHKHUUDWKHUWKDQSOD\HULIWKH
symmetrical  translation  P1¶ ZHUH DVVXPHG DV WKH SD\RII VSDFH IURP ZKLFK WR VHOHFW WKH
solution.  Thus  she suggests that some compromise between the two solutions  S1  and S1¶
should be agreed upon in order to improve over E. However, player 1 may insist that seeking 
a solution in P1¶LVSRLQWOHVVVSDFH31¶LVRQO\DYLUWXDOFRQMHFWXUDOSD\RIIVSDFHDGPLtted for 
convenience of the veil of ignorance exercise, but only P1 is the relevant payoff space of the 
game players will actually play. Agreeing on S1 prevents mere cheap talk because it entails 
reaching an equilibrium point that will be executed in the implementation stage. By contrast, 
if an agreed random mechanism were to select the corresponding solution S1¶SOD\HUFRXOG
simply veto its implementation. Since all this is common knowledge, it can be also anticipated 
by both the players at the stage where they are to select a proper constitution by the social 
contract. In other words, S1¶LVRXWVLGHWKHIHDVLEOHDJUHHPHQWVHWWKDWWKH\FDQUHDFKDWWKLV
VWDJHEHFDXVHSOD\HU¶Vactual concession limit does not extend to include S1¶ 
Note that all these are arguments of rational bargaining. Hence, by similar argument, player 2 
can recall that the solution E, being itself an equilibrium point lying within both spaces P1 and 
P1¶LVWKHVWDWXVTXRRIDEDUJDLQLQJJDPHVHHQDVDVHFRQGWKRXJKWLQWKHFRQVWLtutional 
choice.  In fact, E has been accepted at least as a first step in the selection of the solution; so it 
is the outcome that will be effectively implemented if the players do not agree on any further 
improvement on E. By sticking to E, player 1 can effectively veto any unacceptable change to 57 
 
the constitutional solution. What results is a new bargaining problem which takes E as the 
status quo WKDWGHOLPLWVWKHVHWRISRVVLEOHDJUHHPHQWVDVWKRVHLQFOXGHGZLWKLQWKHSOD\HUV¶
concession limits on the Pareto frontier of P1.   




agreement are different. Whilst player 2 is restricted to claiming only her minimal acceptable 
payoff fixed at E (e.g.  2.5), on the other hand a very large surplus appropriable by player 1 is 
created (e.g. 8.5$Q\PRYHPHQWIURPWKDWSRVLWLRQLQRUGHUWRLPSURYHSOD\HU¶VSD\RII
entails a trade-off (a conflict) between player 1 and player 2. By contrast, restricting player 1 
to claiming only her minimal acceptable payoff set at E (2.5) is of no value to player 2. 
0RYLQJIURPWKLVSRVLWLRQDORQJWKHSD\RIIIURQWLHULQRUGHUWRLPSURYHSOD\HU¶VSD\RIIVRn 
the status quo is also in the best interest of player 2. She fares better and better by also raising 
SOD\HU¶VSD\RIIXQWLOSOD\HU¶VPD[LPXPSRVVLEOHSD\RIILQ3
LVUHDFKHGDW5 6, 3.5). 
This means that player 2 is a much more profitable bargaining partner for player 1 than the 
RWKHUZD\URXQGEHFDXVHWKHUHLVPXFKOHVVEDUJDLQLQJDWWULWLRQLQUHDFKLQJSOD\HU¶VPRVW
desirable agreements - which are also desirable to player 1 - WKDQSOD\HU¶PRVWGHVLUDEOH
agreements. In other words, player 1 iVPXFKUHDGLHUWRVDWLVI\SOD\HU¶VFODLPVWRLPSURYH
KHUSD\RIIWKDQSOD\HULVLQUHJDUGWRSOD\HUVLQFHLQRUGHUWRVDWLVI\SOD\HU¶VPRVW
desired claim, s/he needs to forgo any possible improvements, whereas player 1 does not face 
any payoff renuQFLDWLRQE\VDWLVI\LQJSOD\HU¶VKLJKHVWFODLP7KLVFOHDUO\UHIOHFWVXSRQWKH
Nash bargaining solution relative to the bargaining sub-problem (E, P*) because it coincides 
ZLWKWKHPD[LPLQSRLQW5ZKHUHWKHGLVDGYDQWDJHGSOD\HU¶VSD\RIILVPD[LPL]HG 
Consider again the numerical example of fig. 14. Payoffs at S1 are (8, 3) for player 1 and 2 
respectively.  Both  the  utilitarian  solution  (11)  and  the  Nash  bargaining  product  (24)  are 
maximal at S1 with respect to the entire P1 space. But now impose E as the status quo of a 
QHZEDUJDLQLQJSUREOHPZLWKWKHVXEVSDFH3
DVWKHDSSURSULDWHEDUJDLQLQJVHW3OD\HUV¶
payoffs at E are (2.5, 2.5). Then at the maximin point R =  (5, 3.5) the Nash bargaining 
product is greater than at S1: 
(6 ± 2.5)  x (3.5 ± 2.5) = 3.5   >   (8 ± 2.5 )  x  (3 ± 2.5)  = 2.75  
Thus the players would accept the point R as the constitutional choice of the final payoff 
allocation that must be carried out by selecting the constitution corresponding to P1, which 
entails a redress (from 3 to 3.5) of player 2 with respect to the solution S1 reachable in the 
relevant post-constitutional bargaining game. This shift of the bargaining solution is entirely 58 
 
caused  by  taking  the  egalitarian  solution  E  as  the  appropriate  status  quo  of  the  second 
bargaining step in constitutional choice, an assumption due to impersonality and impartiality 
considerations that are independent of personal well-being. True, this induces setting aside 
welfare  maximization  solutions  belonging  to  P1.  However,  it  does  not  contradict  Pareto-
dominance  at  all,  because  the  solution  R  Pareto-improves  on  E;  or  rather,  it  is  the  only 
acceptable Pareto improvement attainable by rational bargaining from E.   
Summing up,  fairness precedes efficiency in that it establishes the relevant status quo from 
which  the  proper  Pareto  improvement  can  be  calculated.  Moreover,  it  constrains  such 
improvements  to  converge  to  the  maximin  solution  R,  so  that  no  Pareto-efficient 
improvement is admitted whenever there exists another that would reduce the distance from 
perfect  egalitarianism  more  (indeed  R  is  the  point  belonging  to  the  Pareto  frontier  of  P1 
nearest to the bisector).  
 
6.2   Just minimizing transaction costs?     
0XFKFORVHUWRWKHFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHOLWHUDWXUHLV+DQVPDQQ¶VWKHRU\RI³RZQHUVKLS of the 
ILUP´ZKLFKLVEDVHGRQWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWDVLQJOHVWDNHKROGHUFODVVVKRXOGEHJLYHQSURSHUW\
and control over the firm when this regime minimizes the aggregate value of transaction costs 
resulting  from  the  summation  of  governance  costs  held  by  the  controlling  party  and  the 
aggregate  contract  costs  held  by  all  the  remaining  (non-controlling)  stakeholders  (see 
Hansmann, 1988, 1996). This is also an aggregate efficiency or wealth maximization criterion 
seen as a proxy for the utilitarian solution. Hence it is set aside by Rawlsian theory as a 
solution for the constitutional choice of corporate governance institutions.  
Let  us  assume  that  each  post-constitutional  game  played  under  its  relevant  constitution 
generates  aggregate  costs  allocations  accordiQJ WR +DQVPDQQ¶V IRUPXOD DQG WKDW RQH
particular ownership regime minimizes them. Player 1 could bear the minimal governance 
cost with respect to any other player, and also his governance costs could be  smaller than his 
contract cost, so that giving him control over the firm would certainly reduce overall costs 







LQ WHUPV RISOD\HU¶V FRQWUDFW FRVWVLQGXFHG E\SOD\HU¶VDEXVH7KLV PD\KROG HYHQ
WKRXJKE\VXEVWLWXWLQJKHU³QDWXUDO´FRQWUDFWFRVWVZLWKKer governance costs, player 2 could 
RQO\JDLQDVPDOOLPSURYHPHQWLQWHUPVRIHIILFLHQF\)RUH[DPSOHDVVXPHWKDWLQD³VWDWHRI
QDWXUH´RIQRRZQHUVKLSDQGFRQWURORYHUWKHSURGXFWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQZKHUHEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQV
are  only  subject  to  incomplete  contracts,  players  1  and  2  bear  contract  costs  (7,  7) 
respectively. Giving ownership and control  to player 1 would replace his contract costs with 
the minimal governance cost 1, but owing to his abuse of authority such a control structure 
would only slightO\UHGXFHSOD\HU¶VFRQWUDFWFRVWVWR2QWKHRWKHUKDQGJLYLQJRZQHUVKLS
to player 2 would give more protection to player 1 by reducing his contract costs to 5, but it 
ZRXOGLQHIILFLHQWO\UHSODFHSOD\HU¶VFRQWUDFWFRVWVZLWKKHUKLJKJRYHUQDQFHFRVWs set at 4. 
2YHUDOOWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVXQGHUSOD\HU¶VFRQWUROVFRUHDQGDUHPLQLPDOZKHUHDVWKH³VWDWH
RIQDWXUH´EDGO\VFRUHVDQGSOD\HU¶VFRQWUROVFRUHV1RQHWKHOHVVWKHUHLVQRUHDVRQIRU
player 2 to agree to  give control to player 1 rather than claiming control for herself, as long as 
her cost amount to 4 by controlling and to 6 by not controlling.   
The natural response would be to resort to a Kaldor-Hicks efficient side-payment that would 
LPPXQL]HSOD\HUXQGHUSOD\HU¶VFRQWURODJDLQVt the effect of his authority abuse, so that 
her contract costs are kept below 4. But of course in our context the question arises of whether 
or not this side-payment may fall within a feasible outcome set. Giving so much authority to 
party  1  under  the  non-credible  promise  that  he  will  repay  player  2  in  the  future  for  his 
authority abuse   may not correspond to any feasible (equilibrium) solution in the ex post 
perspective.  
According  to  Rawlsian  theory,  in  this  situation  it  may  be  necessary  to  chose  a  different  
governance structure; for example, by giving control to player 2  if this structure may have a 
better egalitarian effect on the payoffs allocation. This happens if this  better (in the Paretian 
sense) egalitarian allocation (i) is an equilibrium point resident within the intersection set of 
the payoff space corresponding to the less efficient governance structure (player 2 control) 
and its symmetrical translation, and (ii) it can be reached from the cost allocation of the post-
constitutional game (e.g. the cost allocation (5,4) ) by moving within the equilibrium set of 
the game. In fact, whereas the first side-payment could be unfeasible, this redress mechanism 
in  favor  of  player  1  corresponds  to  an  equilibrium  point  and  is  therefore  perfectly 
implementable.  
 
6.3   Really is social justice a mirage?    60 
 
There are other commonplace tenets in the field of the economics of institutions that the 
Rawlsian  theory  calls  into  question.  Most  of  the  new-institutional  theorising  on  the 
governance and control structures of the firm (and other institutions) is based on the  implicit 
postulate that institution design cannot go further than prescribing outcomes interpretable to a 
certain extent as spontaneous orders, or at least as corresponding to outcomes that could be 
achieved by a spontaneous order. Hayek would certainly see commercial law and corporate 
governance codes, institutions and principles as sets of norms resulting as spontaneous orders 
from evolution (see also VaQEHUJ¶VLGHDRIFRUSRUDWLRQVDVFRQVWLWXWLonal contracts, Vanberg 
1992).    
Only spontaneous orders are self-enforcing norms, i.e. they do not require the intervention of 
an external Deux ex machina that would heavily constrain individual freedom. This responds 
to a demand for stability. But this statement points out a concern for freedom of choice. It is 
the  same,  but  in  milder  form,  as  the  requirement  that  any  institutional  design  must  be 
³LQFHQWLYHFRPSDWLEOH´± incentives are only relevant to decision makers who are at a certain 
level  free to choose.  
Often, this is not just a descriptive belief concerning the fact that economic agents are more or 
less free  and hence able to  circumvent any strict regulation  that does  not  provide for an 
equilibrium  property.  It  is  also  a  normative  presumption  that  freedom  of  choice  must  be 
respected. Now take this normative value as granted and understand it as the central concern 
of the libertarian standpoint. Our theory has unexpected implications for mild libertarians as 
well. 
 
COROLLARY 2: Mild libertarians cannot but be egalitarians.   
 
A  mild  libertarian  would  not  reject  the  contention  that  individual  agents  must  enter  the 
³RULJLQDO SRVLWLRQ XQGHU WKH YHLO RI LJQRUDQFH´ *UDQWHG WKH SULRULW\ RI IUHHGRP DQG
spontaneous order, s/he would take the veil of ignorance standpoint at least in order to make 
an impartial assessment of possible spontaneous order outcomes and to voluntarily agree on 
VXFKDQRXWFRPHWKDWLVDOVRLQYDULDQWXQGHUWKHV\PPHWULFDOSHUPXWDWLRQRISOD\HUV¶UROHV.  
However,  constraining  the  libertarian  position  with  a  concern  for  impartiality,  plus  the 
concern  for  ex  post  stability  (no  Deus  ex  machina),  has  dramatic  consequences  for  the 
libertarian point of view. Freedom requires spontaneous order (equilibrium), but constraining 
it  by  impartiality  entails  that  the  only  admissible  subset  of  spontaneous  orders  is  the 61 
 
symmetric  intersection  of  the  equilibrium  set  with  its  symmetric  translation.  Thus  only 
governance and control structures providing for an egalitarian payoffs distribution (at least in 
WHUP RI UHGUHVV DUH DFFHSWDEOH 2QFH WKH ³VSRQWDQHRXV RUGHU´ RXWFRPH VSDFH KDV EHHQ
restricted to the symmetrical subset resulting from the intersection of the original space and its 
symmetrical  translation,  the  egalitarian  solution  is  the  only  one  acceptable  through  the 
SOD\HUV¶IUHHDJUHHPHQW 
Libertarians such as Hayek (Hayek, 1973) and Nozick (Nozick, 1974) have militated strongly 
DJDLQVWDQ\UHGLVWULEXWLYHQRWLRQRIVRFLDOMXVWLFH%XWIDUIURPRVWUDFL]LQJWKH³PLUDJHRI
VRFLDOMXVWLFH´HYHQLQWKe small-scale society constituted by the stakeholders of a firm, a 
moderate  impartial  libertarian  cannot  but  be  egalitarian  LQ WKH VHOHFWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V
governance structure.  
 
7   Unique  ex ante equilibrium selection  in the repeated Trust Game and 
end remarks 
 
Let us return to the problem of the ex ante justification of a particular equilibrium as raised in 
part I of this essay. 7KH³JDPHRIOLIH´SOD\HGE\WKHILUPDQGLWVVWDNHKROGHUVZDVWKHQ
represented as a repeated Trust Game (TG) where the entire positive region of the payoff 
space is constituted by Nash equilibria. In this second part, I have been concerned with a 
generalization of this case by taking the constituent game played by the firm (Adam) and the 
stakeholder (Eve) as a generic social diOHPPDUHVHPEOLQJDQDV\PPHWULFSULVRQHUV¶GLOHPPD 
(PD) with an enlarged set of pure strategies. The basic difference is that, in the TG, only one 
VLGHWKHILUPFDQSURILWIRUPDEXVLQJWKHRWKHUSOD\HU¶VWUXVWZRUWK\EHKDYLRUZKHUHDVWKH
only profitable  payoff for the stakeholder is reaching the symmetrical cooperation outcome  
(2,2)  when  ±  as  usually  assumed  ±  it  exists.    In  a  typical  PD  representation  of  the 
stakeholder/firm  interaction,  the  two  parties  would  have  symmetric  abilities  to  cheat  one 
another. The asymmetric PD-like social dilemma here assumed was midway between the two. 
Eve (the stakeholder) is allowed some defection opportunity from the contract, even though 
non-FRRSHUDWLYHUHVRXUFHVZLWKZKLFKWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHRWKHUVLGH¶VFRRSHUDtion are in 
general more profitable to the stronger player Adam (the firm) ± what in fact represents in our 
VLWXDWLRQWKH³JDPHRIOLIH´LPEDODQFHRISRZHUDQGDOVRFDSWXUHVWKHHIIHFWVRIDEXVHRI
authority in the stakeholder /firm interaction. But we can now come back to the trust game, 
which  was  assumed  to  be  the  simplest  and  most  typical  formal  representation  of  the 62 
 
implementation problem related to a CSR social norm based on the social contract of the firm, 
because this problem is addressed through tKHILUPDQGLWVVWDNHKROGHUV¶VWUDWHJLFLQWHUDFWLRQ 
It is remarkable that Rawlsian theory gives a particularly simple and compelling solution to 
the  ex  ante  equilibrium  selection  problem  when  the  repeated  TG  is  considered.  The 
requirement of selecting a solution within the intersection of the basic outcome space XAE 
(see fig. 15) and its symmetric translation  is sufficient for singling out a unique solution, once 
the obvious Pareto dominance condition has been granted, which cannot but be the egalitarian 
Nash bargaining solution of the original game. In order to achieve this result, we need not 
concern ourselves  with  the complex construction of equally probable linear  combinations 
between outcomes resident in a payoff space and its translated version - which is typical of 
the probabilistic interpretation of the veil of ignorance.  
 
Only relevant assumption are impersonality WKHFDSDFLW\WRSHUPXWHWKHLQGLYLGXDOSOD\HUV¶
points  of  view)  plus  feasibility  (to  stay  within  the  intersection  set  generated  through  
impersonality),  so  that  the  solution  must  reside  within  the  intersection  set  generated  by 
rotation of the payoff space XAE around its north-west boundary. But the intersection set is 63 
 
quite peculiar in this case. It exactly coincides with the north-west boundary itself of the 
payoff space, which lies on the bisector. Because it is reduced to a segment of the 45° line, the 
solution cannot but be the only point on this line segment belonging to the Pareto frontier, i.e. 
the symmetric Nash bargaining solution (2,2). 
7KXVDSSO\LQJWKH³YHLORILJQRUDQFHUHDVRQLQJ´ZLWKRXWDDeus ex machina provides a reason 
for selecting the intuitively fair outcome (2,2) of the Trust Game.  
Note that the key point in arriving at this conclusion is simply that an impartial exercise of 
choice (replacement invariance) must select an equilibrium point within the intersection set; 
that is, an equilibrium point that necessarily exists and is therefore implementable by each 
player  whatever  the  position  he  or  she  occupies  in  the  ex  post  perspective.  A  stability 
condition  (the  solution  must  lie  in  the  set  of  those  points  that  correspond  to  ex  post 
LPSOHPHQWDEOHHTXLOLEULDOLQNHGZLWKWKHZHDNIDLUQHVVFRQGLWLRQRILQYDULDQFHWRSOD\HUV¶
replacement is sufficient to derive the egalitarian solution. Thus, the social contract as an 
explicit normative method of impartial reasoning helps resolve the multiplicity problem from 
the ex ante perspective in an extremely simple way in the repeated Trust Game.  
However this result should not be overemphasized as far as the equilibrium selection problem 
is  concerned.    What  would  effectively  solve  the  multiplicity  problem  is  an  equilibrium 
selection theory able to predict the ex post game equilibrium solution so that it is consistent 
with the ex ante solution identified. In other words, selection is ex post effective only if it 
gives reasons to act that fit the ex post reasoning context. Ex post, only common knowledge of 
the  solution  ±  that  is,  a  system  of  mutually  consistent  expectations  converging  on  the 
prediction  of  a  uniquely  determined  equilibrium  point  ±  conveys  to  each  player  the 
appropriate reason to act, because choosing an equilibrium strategy amongst many others 
UHTXLUHVKDYLQJDFOHDUSUHGLFWLRQRIRWKHUSOD\HUV¶EHKDYLRUDQGEHOLHIV+Rwever, from that 
in the ex ante SHUVSHFWLYHDVROXWLRQLVLQYDULDQWWRWKHSOD\HUV¶SRVLWLRQUHSODFHPHQWWKHUHLV
no logical reason to conclude that that solution  will be effectively implemented. The reason 
that justifies a particular decision in the ex post game is knowledge of what the players will 
HIIHFWLYHO\ GR 0RUHRYHU WKLV NQRZOHGJH DERXW WKH RWKHU SOD\HUV¶ GHFLVLRQV PXVW EH
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHLUEHLQJV\PPHWULFDOO\DEOHWRSUHGLFWWKHRWKHUV¶EHKDYLRUDQGWRFKRRVH
their  best  response  to  those  predictions.  Therefore,  it  is  not  the  impartial  selection  of  a 
desirable  ex  ante  VROXWLRQ EXW WKH NQRZOHGJH RI RWKHU SOD\HUV¶ de  facto  behaviors  that 
provides the proper reason for acting in the ex post context. Moreover, there is no logical 
implication from what is fair ex ante selection (even if it falls on an equilibrium point) as to 64 
 
what other players will actually do. Maybe they will act in accordance with the principle, 
maybe  not.  The  fair  ex  ante  agreement,  or  impartial  choice,  does  not  gives  us  common 
knowledge of the ex post behavior of players. If, however, one does not know how other 
players will behave, one has no reason to play a given strategy, even though the fair solution 
is part of an equilibrium point.  
This is not to say that the ex ante agreement on an impartial solution does not provide any cue 
to believe that players will act according to the same principle in the ex post interaction. But 
this is simply a matter of fact, or of cognitive psychology, not a matter of logic. Common 
knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  matter  of  epistemic  logic:  this  means  recursive  group 
knowledge  of  what  everybody  knows  to  be  true  (a  truism).
7  It  is  the  case  that  a  given 
equilibrium  is  commonly  known  to  be  played  only  if  each  player  has  many  layers  of 
knowledge aERXWHYHU\RWKHUSOD\HU¶VDFWLRQEHOLHIVEHOLHIVDERXWEHOLHIVDQGVRRQWKDWDUH
consistent  and  justify  the  prediction  that  this  equilibrium  will  be  played.  This  state  of 
knowledge can be approximated by a theory of belief formation that at last leads us to a stable 
SUHGLFWLRQRIDQ\RWKHUSOD\HU¶VHTXLOLErium choice and belief (see Sacconi 2010c). Ex ante 
selection, on the contrary, does not predict how one will actually decide; it only answers the 
question of what equilibrium should be chosen, becausHLWLVLQYDULDQWXQGHUWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
position replacement. The step from an answer to the question of which equilibrium is fair to 
an answer to the question of how players will actually behave is a default  inference that some 
player may in fact make; but this is just a possibility. Thus, from the perspective of the ex post 
game, there is still much to do before the multiplicity problem is solved. 
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1 7KLVVHFWLRQSUHVHQWVP\RZQDFFRXQWRI%LQPRUH¶VWKHRU\%HFDXVHLWKDVHYROYHGRYHUWLPH%LQPRUH1984, 
1989, 1994, 1998, 2005), I do QRWFODLPWKDWP\WUHDWPHQWLVHQWLUHO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWKDOOWKHWKHRU\¶VVWDWHPHQWV
especially with its multifaceted attempt to give biological and evolutionary foundations to the Rawlsian social 
contract.  But it is the best way for me to make sense of it, and to put it at the basis of my own revision of the 
theory of constitutional choice on corporate governance structures. Even if reference could be made to many of 
%LQPRUH¶VSDSHUVDQGERRNVDQGHVSHFLDOO\WRKLVILUVWSDSHUµGame Theory and the Social Contrac¶t (1984), I 
will confine my references in this section mainly to the last one (Binmore 2005). 
2 For an example, in the case of the repeated trust game see fig. 2 part I. 
3 For a detailed exposition of how the dogmas of the overriding ness of welfare maximization and efficiency over 
fairness permeate all the  economics of institutions, see Kaplow and Shavell   (2002).    
4 see  Kaplow and Shavell (2002).  
5 see  Kaplow and Shavell (2002). 
6 see op. cit. pag. 78. 
7 The ex post rationality of the Nash equilibrium ± implied by the notion of common knowledge ± was already 
clear in Lewis (1968), who also suggested that an agreement could give an empirical explanation of how a state 
of common knowledge could emerge. He, however, focused on the different cognitive phenomena of salience. 
On the  game theoretic definition  of common  knowledge, see Binmore and Brandeburger (1990) and Kreps 
(1990); on the epistemic logic of common knowledge, see Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1996). 
On the selction of  Nash equilibria based on common knowledge of the unique solution see Harsany and Selten 
(1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 